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WHY DOES IT MATTER WHERE I LIVE? WELFARE
REFORM, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND THE
MARYLAND CONSTITUTION
KAREN SYMA CZAPANSKIY*
INTRODUCTION
The policy agenda for welfare reform in 1996 included freeing
states and localities from the demands of a uniform national program.
Giving states and localities authority for program design can be a
boon if the authority is used to create a program that meets the needs
of families in a particular place and time. It can also mean that fami-
lies with similar needs get treated quite differently from one another.
Maryland's not atypical experience of decentralization is the subject
of this Article, in which I ask whether flexibility has been a benefit, a
detriment, or something of each. After I identify some areas of deep
concern, I propose a remedial claim under the equal protection
clause of the Maryland Constitution.
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1996 (PRWORA),' also known as welfare reform, gives
states broad authority to decide whether and how they will help poor
families with children.2 PRWORA created Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) 3 to replace Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC),' the program under which states received federal
funding to help impoverished households with minor children.5 Un-
like AFDC, TANF is not a program with a single national design.6
* Professor, University of Maryland School of Law; B.A., University of California at
Berkeley; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center.
1. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered parts of 42 U.S.C.
§ 601 (2000)).
2. Help for families in poverty comes under Title I of PRWORA called "Block Grants
for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families" or TANF. Id. (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 601(a)(1) (2000)).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619 (2000).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1994).
5. See generally id.
6. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a) (1) (A) (i) (2000) (allowing states to design and imple-
ment programs on a local level), with 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1994). See also Christine N.
Cimini, The New Contract: Welfare Reform, Devolution, and Due Process, 61 MD. L. REv. 246, 256-
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States, and even subunits of states, are free to create TANF programs
of almost any design, so long as the funds are used to achieve one of
the statute's four purposes,7 and so long as the programs satisfy a
handful of federal requirements.8
Freeing states from the federal proscriptions of AFDC is called
"devolution."9 When states share or delegate program design author-
ity to subunits, such as counties, cities, regional authorities, or con-
tractors, the process is called "double devolution" or "second-order
devolution."1 Described as the "real federalism story of welfare re-
form," double devolution or "second-order devolution" is the norm in
many states."
A benign rationale for devolution and double devolution is that
both are necessary complements to the new responsibilities imposed
under TANF for states to move families away from welfare and into
work.' 2 AFDC was largely an income-support program. Most families
57 (2002) (discussing differences between TANF and AFDC). The single national design
in AFDC began breaking down in approximately 1993, when the Clinton administration
began approving large-scale waivers to states undertaking studies of proposals for re-
forming the program. See GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON WELFARE POLICY, MAKING WELFARE
WORK: A FAMILY INVESTMENT SYSTEM: INITIAL FINDINGS OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON
WELFARE POLICY 405 (1993) [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON WELFARE POLICY, INI-
TIAL FINDINGS] (discussing the federal AFDC waiver program generally and the Primary
Prevention Initiative, a major Maryland Project operating under a federal waiver).
7. TANF funds may be spent to:
(1) provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in their
own homes or in the homes of relatives;
(2) end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting
job preparation, work, and marriage;
(3) prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish
annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these
pregnancies; and
(4) encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.
42 U.S.C. §§ 601 (a) (1)-(4) (2000).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 602 (detailing the plan states must submit to the federal govern-
ment); § 607 (listing mandatory work requirements); § 608 (listing prohibitions).
9. Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and Diminished Democracy
in Local Government Contracts for Welfare-To-Work Services, 28 FoRDHAm URa. L.J. 1559, 1559-60
(2001).
10. Id. at 1565; RICHARD P. NATHAN & THOMAS L. GAIS, IMPLEMENTING THE PERSONAL
RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1996: A FIRST LOOK 35 (1999).
11. NATHAN & GAIS, supra note 10, at 35.
12. H.R. REP. No. 104-651, introduction, at 5-6 (1996); NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIA-
TION POLICY POSITIONS: HR-36 WELFARE REFORM POLICY 36.1, available at http://
www.nga.org/nga/legislativeUpdate/policy Position Detail Print/1,1 390,554,00.html (last
visited Feb. 19, 2004). But see Matthew Diller, The New Localism in Welfare Advocacy, 19 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 413, 416 (2000) (implying devolution limits potential liability for
class action lawsuits); Christine N. Cimini, Welfare Entitlements in the Era of Devolution, 9 GEO.
J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 89, 90-91 (2002) (suggesting less benign rationales behind devo-
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who met financial eligibility standards were entitled to a cash assis-
tance grant. 13 The administrative tasks were straightforward, and the
standards, largely national, determined which families met the finan-
cial eligibility standards. A check was issued to those found eligible. 4
TANF is quite different. Families have no entitlement to a cash
grant.15 If a state decides to make cash grants available, they can use
federal funds, but only if they comply with certain rules. In most
cases, federal funds can be spent for cash assistance only in programs
where members of families are participating in activities designed to
move the families from receiving welfare to employment. 6 Most fami-
lies can receive federally funded cash assistance for a maximum of
sixty months.17 Programs must use sanctions when family members
fail to comply with work activity requirements.18
The administrative tasks imposed by TANF are complex. Appli-
cant families must still be assessed for financial eligibility,19 but that is
not enough. If cash assistance is temporary and someone in the fam-
ily has to get ready for employment, an adult's work-readiness and
potential barriers to employment should be identified, and a plan de-
veloped for the family to leave welfare.2" Work-readiness is best un-
derstood in light of actual employment opportunities and conditions,
so administrative tasks also should include gaining an appreciation of
local and regional employment and training conditions.2 1
lution may include the inability of recipients to mount nationalized advocacy strategies or
oversight processes, and the restricting of procedural due process).
13. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (stating that welfare benefits "are a
matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them").
14. See Cimini, supra note 6 (discussing the distribution of welfare benefits under
AFDC's cooperative federalism model); see also Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 287-88
(1971) (finding that the only discretion granted to states in determining whether an 18-20
year old student was entitled to benefits was whether the student "'regularly attend[ed]' a
bona fide" institution); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 311-13 (1968) (holding that a state
regulation denying benefits to children whose mothers cohabitate with "substitute fathers"
was beyond the discretion granted to states under the AFDC program).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (2000).
16. Id § 602(a) (1) (A) (ii) (TANF funds available only to states that require parents or
caretaker recipients "to engage in work").
17. Id. § 608(a) (7) (A) (funding is only available to state programs that do not use fed-
eral funds for cash assistance to families beyond sixty months, or five years).
18. Id. § 607 (defining mandatory work activity requirements and corresponding
sanctions).
19. See 45 C.F.R. § 233.10 (2003).
20. See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and En-
trepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1121, 1148-49, 1167-68 (2000) (considering the
administration of work requirements under TANF).
21. Id. at 1167-68.
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The combination of individualized services and sanctions con-
templated under TANF is, theoretically, the opposite of the standard-
ized benefit program of AFDC. To achieve TANF's goals,
administrators and case managers must address individual problems
in the particular community where recipients live. 22 Devolution and
double-devolution can give administrators flexibility and opportuni-
ties to satisfy TANF's goals.23
An example may help to explain the need for local variability.
Some suburban locations offerjob opportunities for people who share
characteristics with many adults who receive welfare: relatively low ed-
ucational achievement, limited employment history, and responsibility
for minor children. Mothers living in suburban locations may be able
to get to the jobs, but they may need help with finding and paying for
childcare, particularly if the job requires work during non-standard
hours such as evenings and weekends. A mother with identical family
responsibilities and educational and employment background who
lives in an inner city faces rather different problems. She cannot get
to the job without transportation help. Having ajob far from home,
moreover, makes her childcare arrangements more difficult due to
her extended travel time and her corresponding inability to respond
quickly to an emergency. Under TANF, local administrators can use
their knowledge of the barriers to employment faced by the families
they serve to develop programs that can help lower those barriers.2 4
Under AFDC, both the suburban and the inner city family re-
ceived a cash assistance grant if they were financially eligible.2 5 Under
TANF, on the other hand, each family's situation should be assessed
to determine how the family could leave welfare. 26 A state's TANF
program should make available whatever resources it has determined
to be appropriate for that family.27 After completing its assessment of
the suburban family, the TANF agency might provide a small cash as-
sistance grant during the first few months after the mother begins em-
ployment. To help the mother retain her employment, the family
22. NATHAN & GAIS, supra note 10, at 35-39. But see Karen Syma Czapanskiy, Parents,
Children, and the Work-First Welfare Reform: Where is the C in TANF?, 61 MD. L. REv. 308 (2002)
(critiquing individualization as the best approach, in light of systemic unemployment and
underemployment of parents and other caretakers).
23. See NATHAN & GAIs, supra note 10, at 35-39 (discussing the role of devolution and
double devolution under TANF).
24. Id.
25. See Cimini, supra note 6, at 254-55 (describing the entitlement approach to welfare
distribution under the AFDC).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1) (i) (2000).
27. Id. § 604(a).
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might also receive help in finding or paying for childcare. TANF
funds might be spent to help recipients or others develop and provide
a responsive childcare program. After completing its assessment of
the inner city family, the TANF agency might help to provide the fam-
ily with help to buy, fix, or insure a car rather than authorize a
monthly cash assistance grant. Alternatively, the agency might fund a
vanpool to supplement the public transportation system. The parent
might be referred to specialized childcare providers to help meet her
need for childcare for an unusually long day away from home. Or the
parent might be helped to move to a location closer to available
jobs.28
While devolution and double devolution hold out the promise of
individualized service and locally tailored programs, they also involve
the risk that similarly situated people will be treated quite differently
for no apparent reason other than the location of their home. For
example, two mothers who live in different parts of a state cannot at-
tend their mandated work activity because of interference by a violent
partner. In one county, the mother's need for protection from do-
mestic violence is identified and her work activity plan is modified to
help her gain a degree of safety for herself and her children. 29 In
another, different service policies and case management practices
make it difficult for her situation to be identified or for her safety
needs to be met.:30
Perhaps two fathers who live a few miles apart in different coun-
ties are offeredjobs. Neither can get to the newjob without a car, and
each has a car in need of repair. One county provides money for car
repairs, but the other does not.31 Two children with severe emotional
28. See Mark Greenberg & Elise Richer, How States Used TANF and MOE Funds in FY
2002: The Picture from Federal Reporting, Center for Law and Social Policy (2003), for a dis-
cussion of how states recently have allocated TANF funds.
29. Karen Syma Czapanskiy, Domestic Violence and the Maryland Family Violence Option, 11
AM. U.J. GENDER Soc. POL'v & L. 447, 451-61 (2003).
30. Id.
31. Welfare Assistance Grant (WAG) policies vary from jurisdiction tojurisdiction. For
example, the policy for WAGs in Baltimore City is to give the recipient who becomes em-
ployed an alternative to on-going Temporary Cash Assistance (TCA) after employment, or
to speed up or facilitate the return of an employed applicant to the workforce, or to con-
tribute to the start-up of a self-employment venture. BALTIMORE CITY DEPARTMENT OF SO-
CIAL SERVICES, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL: #02-01, WELFARE AVOIDANCE
GRANTS (revised) 2 (2002) [hereinafter SOP #02-01]. In Montgomery County, WAGs are
used more broadly to cover any employment related expense that could prevent employ-
ment or job loss. MONTGOMERY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, FY
2002 FIP PLAN (2001) [hereinafter MONTGOMERY COUNTY PLAN]. WAGs are used in St.
Mary's County as work expense reimbursements: recipients are reimbursed for expenses
related to obtaining and retaining employment such as uniforms, tools, transportation, or
2004]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
problems live in different counties. In one, the local welfare agency
helps parents locate specialized daycare providers; in the other, par-
ents are given two weeks to find a place for the child. If the parent
misses the assigned work activity because no specialized daycare is
found, he or she faces a sanction. 32 Some jurisdictions do substantial
assessments and tailor work-readiness programs closely to the needs of
the family and the local employment opportunities. Other jurisdic-
tions do more casual assessments and require family members to
spend time in programs that have little relationship to local economic
conditions. Some jurisdictions emphasize immediate sanctions as a
way to enforce work requirements and other program requirements,
while other jurisdictions emphasize case management practices as the
way to help families leave welfare.
Given the racialized history of AFDC3 3 and the racially-coded
rhetoric surrounding welfare reform,34 two additional questions must
be asked. Do devolution and double devolution pose particular risks
for African-American families in poverty to be treated less favorably
than other families? And does the fact that double devolution em-
powers state subdivisions to design different programs create a risk
that families living in heavily African-American localities will experi-
ence less favorable treatment than families living in localities with
more European-American families?
Early studies of TANF demonstrated that states electing the more
draconian policies in terms of sanctions and time limits under TANF
were frequently the same states that had the highest percentages of
auto repairs. ST. MARY'S COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, PROJECT DESCRIPTION
OUTLINE (SFY 2002), 030 CUSTOMER WORK EXPENSE REIMBURSEMENT (2001) [hereinafter
ST. MARY'S COUNTY PLAN].
32. For example, one of my clients in Baltimore had a toddler with severe asthma. He
could not be left in the care of anyone who lacked specialized training on equipment that
would help the child breathe during an attack. When I told the caseworker about the need
for specialized childcare, my client and I were referred to the computerized listing of child-
care providers in the lobby. Not a single appropriate provider was listed, but that did not
deter the caseworker from warning my client to show up at her work activity in two weeks
or face another sanction.
33. See generally Sanford F. Schram, Putting a Black Face on Welfare: The Good and The Bad,
in PRAXIS FOR THE POOR: PIVEN AND CLOWARD AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN SOCIAL
WELFARE 157 (2002) [hereinafter PRAXIS FOR THE POOR]; DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, SHATTERED
BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2002); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Value of Black
Mothers' Work, in CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER [hereinafter CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM]
312 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997); Nathalie A. Augustin, Learnfare and Black Mother-
hood: The Social Construction of Deviance, in CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM 144 (Adrien Katherine
Wing ed., 1997); MIMI ABRAMOWITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE
POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 318-26 (1988).
34. See generally Note, Dethroning the Welfare Queen: The Rhetoric of Reform, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 2013 (1994).
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African Americans among their residents. 5 Similar racialized pat-
terns were found where states could make policy choices under
AFDC. 6 Where case-managers had opportunities to use discretion
under AFDC, further, race discrimination was not unexpected.3 7 Sim-
ilar issues are being found by researchers investigating opportunities
for recipients to take advantage of benefits under TANF.38 Many Afri-
can Americans live in inner cities. Residents of inner cities, in gen-
eral, do not experience the same levels of success in TANF as residents
of non-urban areas.3 9 Where a state permits local variations in TANF
programs, locations where African Americans are concentrated are
adopting programs that are more draconian or simply less responsive
to the needs of local residents.4 °
Since 1997, I have been doing research into and advocacy around
welfare reform in Maryland,4 1 a State whose welfare administrators
embraced a form of double devolution in 1996.42 My advocacy col-
leagues and I were impressed with how different welfare reform ap-
peared in Baltimore City, where the largest percentage of welfare
recipients live, as compared with welfare reform in the other twenty-
35. Sanford F. Schram &Joe Soss, Success Stories: Welfare Reform, Policy Discourse, and the
Politics of Research, 577 ANNALS Am. AcAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 49-65 (2001), reprinted in PRAXIS
FOR THE POOR, supra note 33, at 186, 194, 197.
36. See RODNEY E. HERO, FACES OF INEQUALITY: SOCIAL DIVERSITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS
94-96 (1998); Robert C. Lieberman & John S. Lapinski, American Federalism, Race and the
Administration of Welfare, 31 BRIT. J. POL. ScI. 303, 303-29 (2001).
37. Sanford F. Schram, The Old is New: The Racial Basis of Welfare Reform, in PRAXIS FOR
THE POOR 139, 143-44 (2002); HERO, supra note 36, at 94-96.
38. Schram & Soss, supra note 35, at 194; see also Linda Burnham, Welfare Reform, Family
Hardship, and Women of Color, 577 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 38 (2001); Susan
Tinsley Gooden, Race and Welfare: Examining Employment Outcomes of White and Black Recipi-
ents, 4J. PoE. 21, 31-39 (2000).
39. See generally JOHN FOSTER-BEY, METROPOLITAN GROWTH AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
FOR THE POOR: IF YOU'RE POOR DOES PLACE MATTrER? (2001). In urban areas, this may be
related to double devolution.
40. See Schram & Soss, supra note 35, at 194 (noting that the harshest TANF rules have
been disproportionately applied where African Americans comprise a higher proportion
of welfare recipients).
41. See Czapanskiy, supra notes 22 and 30; see also Karen Syma Czapanskiy, Unemployment
Insurance and Moms, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1093 (2004); Karen Syma Czapanskiy, AL!
Child Support Principles: A Lesson in Public Policy and Truth-Telling, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL'Y 259 (2001); FAMILY INVESTMENT PROGRAM LEGAL CLINIC, TIME OUT! A STATUS RE-
PORT ON WELFARE REFORM IN BALTIMORE CITY AT THE THREE YEAR MARK, As EXPERIENCED BY
THOSE IT WAS INTENDED TO HELP AND THEIR LEGAL ADVOCATES (1999), available at http://
www.law.umaryland.edu/facpages/kczapanskiy/Time-Out_- Final.pdf (last visited Feb. 24,
2004) [hereinafter FAMILY INVESTMENT PROGRAM LEGAL CLINIC, STATUS REPORT]; http://
www.hprplaw.org, the website of the Homeless Persons Representation Project.
42. MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, MARYLAND STATE PLAN FOR FAMILY
INVESTMENT PROGRAM (1996) [hereinafter State Plan of 1996], submitted to the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (2000).
2004]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
three jurisdictions in the state.4" In Maryland, substantial power is ex-
ercised either by the State or by the counties.44 There are twenty-
three counties and one city, Baltimore, that is treated as a county.45
In this Article, I refer to the twenty-three counties and Baltimore City
as the 'jurisdictions." Baltimore City is also one of two jurisdictions in
the State with a majority of African-American residents.4 6 In this Arti-
cle, I will describe a few examples of how families experience welfare
reform differently depending on which of the twenty-four jurisdic-
tions they live in. Where the data permit, I will show how welfare re-
form in Baltimore City and the other majority African-American
jurisdiction, Prince George's County,4 7 vary from the experience of
welfare reform in the other twenty-two jurisdictions.4" I will then ex-
amine what legal theories might apply to issues of geographic discrim-
ination raised by double devolution in Maryland.
My legal focus is on state constitutional law theories. My conclu-
sion is that double devolution, at least as practiced in Maryland, may
be unconstitutional under the state constitution because it results in
residents of the state being treated differently solely on the basis of
their residence in the absence of adequate justification except, poten-
tially, in the area of narrowly localized employment-related prac-
tices.49 I come to this conclusion using the state's equal protection
clause,5 ° which has been held to incorporate a rational basis with bite
test.51 I then address how to reorganize welfare reform in light of the
constitutional problems.
43. Baltimore City had the highest percentage of citizens living in poverty of any
county in Maryland in 1999. MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, FACT PACK
2002, at 98 (2002), available at http://www.dhr.state.md.us/pi.pdf/fpo2intr.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 24, 2004) [DHR FACT PACK 2002].
44. In re Legislative Districting of State, 370 Md. 312, 358-59, 805 A.2d 292, 319 (2002).
45. MD. ANN. CODE art. 24, § 1-101(b) (2001).
46. DHR FACT PACK 2002, supra note 43, at 61. In 2000, the African-American popula-
tion of Baltimore City totaled 418,951, while the white population totaled only 205,982. Id.
47. Id. In 2000, the African-American population of Prince George's County topped
500,000 while its white population totaled only 216,729. Id.
48. Professor Cheryl Miller and I have spent some time examining in greater depth
one of the practices, welfare avoidance grants.
49. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTs. art. 24. An argument can be made that double devolu-
tion is illegal because it is not authorized by the legislature under the Administrative Proce-
dures Act. MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T §§ 10-101 to -139 (1999). That argument,
however, is not pursued in this Article.
50. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTs. art. 24. Maryland does not have a stand-alone equal
protection clause, but Article 24 encompasses the concept. See, e.g., Kirsch v. Prince
George's County, 331 Md. 89, 96, 626 A.2d 372, 375 (1993).
51. See infra notes 221-248 and accompanying text.
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I. DOUBLE DEVOLUTION IN ACTION
A. Background
During the early 1990s, Maryland, like many states, began to in-
vestigate how to reform its welfare program. 2 At the time, the federal
government was accepting proposals from states to waive program re-
quirements under AFDC so that states could experiment with new
ways of delivering assistance to families in poverty.5 3 A task force, ap-
pointed by the governor to formulate an experimental program for
Maryland, submitted two reports during 1993 and 1994, but no bill
passed the legislature.54 When PRWORA was passed in 1996, the op-
portunity for a waiver ended. All states were required to develop
plans for implementing welfare reform in order to become eligible for
funding.55 In anticipation of the passage of PRWORA, the Maryland
legislature passed a bill in 1996 reflecting many of the task force's
recommendations.56 The State's Department of Human Resources
(DHR) relied heavily on the new bill as the basis for the State Plan,
submitted to the federal government in 1996 to qualify the State for
TANF funding.57 One significant feature of the State Plan, however,
was brand new: double devolution.58
As described in the State Plan, double devolution meant that fed-
eral funding "will be allocated to local jurisdictions."59 Local jurisdic-
tions, the Plan said, "kno [w] best the kinds of resources available to,
and services needed by, their customers."6 ° While every jurisdiction
52. See COMMISSION ON WELFARE POLICY, INITIAL FINDINGS, supra note 6, at 1-5 (noting
that the current welfare system, AFDC, was in need of reform because of its failure to
reward efforts to seek employment, its discrimination of two-parent families, and its provi-
sion of benefits greater than those achievable by the working poor); see also GovERNoR'S
COMMISSION ON WELFARE POLICY, MAKING WELFARE WORK "FOR THE GOOD OF THE
WHOLE . . . ," FINAL REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON WELFARE POLICY, at 6-8
(1994) [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON WELFARE POLICY, FINAL REPORT] (noting
the same programs as acknowledged in the 1993 commission and recommending a num-
ber of programs that would require welfare recipients to enter into job skills training and
to actively seek employment-making welfare "a program of temporary assistance, rather
than a dependent way of life").
53. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON WELFARE POLICY, INITIAL FINDINGS, supra note 6, at 4.
54. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON WELFARE POLICY, FINAL REPORT, supra note 52, at 7.
Legislation passed earlier was vetoed by the governor for failure to implement a family cap
on assistance and because the legislature did not remove restrictions on Medicaid-funded
abortions. Id. at 7.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (2000).
56. 1996 Md. Laws, ch. 351, § 2.
57. See generally STATE PLAN OF 1996, supra note 42.
58. Id. at 1.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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would be required to make available all the components of the welfare
reform program, " [t] he requirements and procedures may be tailored
to fit the unique population of the jurisdiction."6
The two task force reports never mentioned double devolution.6 2
In fact, both anticipated that welfare reform would be administered as
AFDC had been administered in recent decades.63 Double devolution
is also not mentioned in the 1996 statute authorizing the creation of
the Family Investment Program (FIP), as welfare is called in Mary-
land.64 The statute, to the contrary, incorporates an assumption that
FIP would be a statewide program.65 For example, the Secretary of
DHR is charged with supervising the administration of the program, 66
and recipients sign an agreement with the Department about mutual
responsibilities.67 Local departments are mentioned, but in the same
context that would have applied under AFDC: as administrators of a
program whose rules and policies are established by DHR.68 It was
not until 1997 that the legislature authorized the Secretary to grant
waivers permitting local departments not to comply with state law or
regulations under FIP.6' Local variability under the waiver section is
much narrower than that described in the State Plan; variations are
61. The components of the welfare reform program include Welfare Avoidance
Grants, Child Care and Medical Assistance, Temporary Cash Assistance, and other pro-
grams targeted at special problems and populations. See generally id.
62. See generally GOvERNOR'S COMMISSION ON WELFARE POLICY, INITIAL FINDINGS, supra
note 6; GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON WELFARE POLICY, FINAL REPORT, supra note 52.
63. Id. Under AFDC, statewide policies were adopted by the central office of the DHR.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, §§ 1-2 (1985). In 23 of the 24 local jurisdictions, the benefit
program was administered by "local" departments. Id. § 3. Except in one jurisdiction,
which has a human resources department under contract to the state, "local" departments
are not local in the usual sense of the word. They are instead subdivisions of the State
DHR that happen to have boundaries contiguous with the boundaries of the 23 local juris-
dictions. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 14A (2003). The only official of a local department
whose appointment is subject to influence by the county's government is the director. Id.
Each county and the City of Baltimore (treated as equivalent to a county for this purpose)
may nominate candidates for the position of director. Id. § (14). The Secretary of DHR
makes the appointment and also holds the sole right to dismiss the director. Id. § 1 (b).
64. See generally 1996 Md. Laws, ch. 351.
65. Id. § 46 (codified as amended at MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § IA (2003)) (enabling
the State Department to supervise, direct, and control activities of local departments).
Contra, Richard Larson, of the Family Investment Administration, argues that the provision
in HB 757 making cash assistance an entitlement gives DHR permission to provide for
local authority in everything else. Telephone interview with Richard Larson, Director, Of-
fice of Policy, Research & Systems, Family Investment Administration (June 6, 2002).
66. 1996 Md. Laws, ch. 351, § 1A(c) (codified as amended at MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A,
§§ IA, 46 (2003)).
67. 1996 Md. Laws, ch. 351, § 2(49)(3).
68. Id. § 2(3)(a)(2) (codified as amended at MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 46 (2003)).
69. 1997 Md. Laws, ch. 593, § 4 (codified as amended at MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 50
(2003)).
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permitted only upon specific showings about the importance of the
waiver.7° One of the justifications for a waiver, interestingly, is that it
will "provide additional flexibility to the local department in adminis-
tering" FIP.7  Again, however, the focus is on flexibility in administra-
tion, which is quite different from the State Plan, which delegates to
the local departments the job of program design.72 The state is also
permitted to fund demonstration projects in several counties. 73 The
assumption seems to be that, except where a waiver or a demonstra-
tion is involved, the entire state has one design for welfare reform.
Local departments began to submit local plans to the State in late
1996 and early 1997. Plans are to be updated annually.74 According
to the State Plan, plans are subject to review and approval by DHR.75
Each describes in general terms how the TANF money allocated to the
local department will be spent in the coming year.76 Although some
of the plans include information about some local employment condi-
tions, there is no requirement that local employment conditions be
described or that the local office identify how the plan is related to
local employment conditions.77 In no instance, it appears, has DHR
rejected or required modification of a local plan.
Based on their local plans, as well as on the statute, regulations
and statewide policy documents, local departments of social services
began to implement TANF in January of 1997. The outcome data
indicates that, on a number of measures, the benefits received, and
burdens encountered by, applicants and recipients of TANF vary de-
pending on where the applicant or recipient lives.78
B. Examples of Variability in TANE Benefits and Burdens
1. Welfare Utilization.-Between 1997 and 2001, economic condi-
tions in Maryland echoed the trend felt throughout the country:
growth in jobs accompanied by declines in unemployment. 79 The
70. Compare MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 50 (2003) (allowing waivers in situations where
substance abuse or domestic violence is present), with STATE PLAN OF 1996, supra note 42,
at 6.
71. 1997 Md. Laws, ch. 593, § 4(b) (3).
72. STATE PLAN OF 1996, supra note 42, at 1.
73. Id. at 7.
74. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 1A(d)(2) (2003).
75. STATE PLAN OF 1996, supra note 42, at 1.
76. See, e.g., Montgomery County Plan, supra note 31.
77. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 2(d)(2).
78. See discussion infra Part I.B.
79. MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LICENSING AND REGULATION, MARYLAND CAREER
AND WORKFORCE INFORMATION: CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE, EMPLOYMENT & UNEMPLOYMENT, BY
PLACE OF RESIDENCE 1978-2002 (2003), available at http://www.dllr.state.md.us/lmi/laus/
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percentage of families in poverty also fell.8" But beginning in approxi-
mately 2001, employment began to shrink, unemployment rates be-
gan to rise, and the percentage of families in poverty began to rise
again." Because TANF is, at least in part, an income support pro-
gram for low and no-income families, caseloads logically should fall
during times of economic growth and grow during hard economic
times. Nevertheless, the story of welfare utilization in Maryland in the
late 1990s and early 2000s is more complex than a predictable
counter-cyclical pattern.
The number of families receiving welfare assistance declined by
67% in Maryland during the good economic times of the late 1990s. 8 2
As shown on Chart 1, the decline was not consistent across the State.8 3
Baltimore City's TANF rolls declined approximately 54% between Jan-
uary 1995 and October 2000. Other jurisdictions experienced de-
clines ranging from 69% to 90%.
The difference between the decline in TANF rolls in Baltimore
City and the decline in the rest of the State are most likely explained
by the differences in employment opportunities that distinguish Balti-
more from most of the rest of the state's counties. 84 Baltimore exper-
ienced an unemployment rate of 8.1% in 2000, one of its better rates
in recent years.85 Compared to the rest of the state, however, the rate
lausmain.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004) [hereinafter DLLR MARYLAND CAREER AND
WORKFORCE INFORMATION, STATE STATISTICS].
80. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY 1999, TABLE C. PERCENT OF PERSONS IN POVERTY,
BY STATE: 1997, 1998, AND 1999 (2000), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/
poverty99/pv99state.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2004). The U.S. Census statistics indicate
that Maryland's poverty rate fell by 0.6% between 1997 and 1999. Id.
81. In 1999 the average annual unemployment rate in Baltimore was 3.5%; in 2000 the
rate was up to 3.8%, and at the end of 2001, had risen just slightly to 4.0% and increased to
4.4% for 2002. DLLR, MARYLAND CAREER AND WORKFORCE INFORMATION, STATE STATISTICS,
supra note 79.
82. MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, THE FAMILY INVESTMENT ADMINISTRA-
TION 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 20-21 (2000) [hereinafter FAMILY INVESTMENT ADMINISTRATION
2000 ANNUAL REPORT]. In January 1995, 227,887 individuals were receiving benefits under
AFDC in Maryland. Id. at 20. In October 2000, the number of individuals receiving cash
assistance under TANF was 76,336. Id.
83. See Chart 1 infra (comparing the percentage decline in TANF rolls in Maryland's
counties between January 1995 and October 2000).
84. Baltimore's experience is similar to that of many urban areas. See Bruce Katz &
Katherine Allen, Cities Matter: Shifting the Focus of Welfare Reform, 19 BROOKINCS REV., Sum-
mer 2001, 30, 31 (noting that the decline in welfare roles in "89 urban counties that con-
tain the 100 largest American cities, the aggregate [welfare] caseload fell 41% from 1994 to
1999-more than 10 percentage points short of the 52% drop in the national rate").
85. MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LICENSING AND REGULATION, MARYLAND CAREER
AND WORKFORCE INFORMATION: CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE, EMPLOYMENT & UNEMPLOYMENT,
BALTIMORE CITY (2003), available at http://www.dllr.state.md.us/lmi/laus/lausmain.htm
(last visited Mar. 25, 2004) [hereinafter DLLR MARYLAND CAREER AND WORKFORCE INFOR-
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was still quite high; the statewide unemployment rate in 2000 was only
3.8%.86 When examining employment opportunities in light of the
percentage of the employed population, Baltimore City again does
not fare as well as most of the State. Taken as a whole, 59.5% of Mary-
land's female residents over the age of sixteen are employed.87 Only
48.8% of Baltimore City's female residents over the age of sixteen are
employed.88
Outside of Baltimore City, the rate of decline in TANF rolls does
not consistently mirror either the unemployment rate or the employ-
ment rate of the jurisdiction. Charts 2 through 5 compare local TANF
roll reductions with local unemployment rates and the rates at which
women over the age of sixteen are employed in the six jurisdictions
with the highest and lowest TANF roll reductions.
Chart 2 compares the decline in TANF utilization between 1995
and 2000 with the unemployment rates in 2000 in the six jurisdictions
that experienced the largest and smallest declines in TANF utiliza-
tion."t In the three jurisdictions with the largest declines in TANF
utilization (Allegany, Howard, and Washington), the unemployment
rate ranged from a low of 2.4% in Howard County to a high of 8.9%
in Allegany County. In the three jurisdictions with the smallest de-
clines in TANF utilization, the unemployment rate ranged from a low
of 4.2% in Baltimore County to a high of 8.1% in Baltimore City. The
jurisdiction with the highest unemployment rate, Allegany County, ex-
perienced a 90% decline in TANF utilization, while the jurisdiction
with the lowest unemployment rate, Howard County, also experienced
a decline of nearly 90% in TANF utilization. The jurisdiction with an
unemployment rate closest to Allegany's, Baltimore City, experienced
a TANF utilization decline of only 56%.
MATION BALTIMORE CITY STATISTICS] (noting the following previous Baltimore City unem-
ployment rates: 1995-8.5%; 1996-8.3%; 1997-9.6%; 1998-9.2%; and 1999-7.3%).
86. DLLR MARYLAND CAREER AND WORKFORCE INFORMATION STATE STATISTICS, supra
note 79 (noting the following previous Maryland unemployment rates: 1995-5.1%; 1996-
4.9%; 1997-5.1%; 1998-4.6%; 1999-3.5%; and 2000-3.8%).
87. MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING, PLANNING DATA SERVICES, TABLE DP-3. PRO-
FILE OF SELECTED ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS: 2000, MARYLAND (2002), available at http://
www.mdp.state.md.us.msdc/census/cen2000/sf3/sumyprof/DP3_chge$/baci-dp3c.pdf
(last visited Apr. 7, 2004) [hereinafter TABLE DP-3 PROFILE OF MARYLAND].
88. MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING, PLANNING DATA SERVICES, TABLE DP-3. PRO-
FILE OF SELECTED ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS: 2000, BALTIMORE (2002), available at http://
www.mdp.state.md.us/msdc/census/cen2000/sf3/sumyprof/DP3_chge$/baci-dp3c.pdf
(last visited Apr. 7, 2004) [hereinafter TABLE DP-3 PROFILE OF BALTIMORE].
89. See Chart 2 supra. The unemployment rate in 2000 is used as a proxy for the trend
in unemployment rates throughout the late 1990s. The same relationship between TANF
utilization and unemployment rates would be found if the change in unemployment be-
tween 1995 and 2000 were substituted for the unemployment rate in 2000.
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CHART 2
TANF ROLLS COMPARED WITH UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, 2000
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MD. DEP'T PLANNING, Variables from "Table DP-3. Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics: 2000," on file with author, MD. DEP'T HUM. RESOURCES, FAMILY
INVESTMENT ADMINISTRATION MONTHLY STATISTICAL REPORTS (Dec. 2002).
Chart 2 demonstrates that TANF utilization and the unemploy-
ment rate, at least outside of Baltimore City, are not well correlated.
Jurisdictions with high unemployment rates had dissimilar changes in
TANF utilization, while jurisdictions with similar rates of change in
TANF utilization had dissimilar rates of unemployment.
Chart 3 compares the decline in TANF utilization between 1995
and 2000 with the rates of employment of women age sixteen and
over in 1999, as reported in the 2000 census.9" The Chart provides
the data for the six jurisdictions that experienced the largest and
smallest declines in TANF utilization.91
In the three jurisdictions with the largest declines in TANF utili-
zation (Allegany, Howard, and Washington), the rate of female em-
90. See Chart 3 supra. The female employment rate in 1999 is used as a proxy for the
trend in employment rates throughout the late 1990s.
91. To determine the unemployment rate, a random sample of working-age people are
asked if they are unemployed and seeking work. Those who answer yes are counted 
as
unemployed. Those who are not seeking work or who have stopped seeking work are not
counted. Employment rates, on the other hand, are based on U.S. Census Bureau surveys
asking people if they are employed. Those who answer yes are compared to the set 
of all
people who are of working age. The employment rate, therefore, is a more precise mea-
sure of employment than the unemployment rate. Employment surveys are not taken 
as
frequently as unemployment surveys, however, nor is the data commonly made available
for jurisdictions as small as counties. Unemployment rates must substitute for employment
rates, therefore, when data is required more frequently or for particular geographic 
areas.
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CHART 3
LARGE JURISDICTIONS: COMPARING FEMALE EMPLOYMENT AND TANF
CASELOAD REDUCTIONS
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MD. DEP'T PLANNING, Variables from "Table DP-3. Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics: 2000," on file with author, MD. DEP'T Hum. RESOURCES, FAMILY
INVESTMENT ADMINISTRATION MONTHLY STATISTICAL REPORTS (Dec. 2002).
ployment varied from 45.3% in Allegany County to 66.8% in Howard
County. In the three jurisdictions with the smallest declines in TANF
utilization (Garrett, Baltimore County, and Baltimore City), the rate
of female employment varied from 48.8% in Baltimore City to 58.5%
in Baltimore County. In three jurisdictions (Allegany, Garrett, and
Baltimore City), the female employment rate was between 45% and
55%. These jurisdictions have experienced TANF reduction rates of
90%, 72%, and 54%, respectively. In three jurisdictions (Howard,
Washington, and Baltimore County), the female employment rate was
between 56% and 66%. These jurisdictions have experienced TANF
reduction rates of, respectively, 89%, 87%, and 69%.
Chart 3 demonstrates that TANF utilization and the rate of fe-
male employment bear little relationship to one another, at least
outside of Baltimore City. Jurisdictions with high employment rates
had dissimilar rates of change in TANF utilization, while jurisdictions
with similar rates of change in TANF utilization had dissimilar rates of
female employment.
It is possible that some of the variation is accounted for by the
fact that the counties vary considerably in terms of population. When
only the five largest jurisdictions are compared, caseload reductions
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CHART 4
LARGE JURISDICTIONS: COMPARING FEMALE EMPLOYMENT AND TANF
CASELOAD REDUCTIONS
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Characteristics: 2000," on file with author, MD. DEP'T HUM. ReSOURCES, FAMILY
INVESTMENT ADMINISTRATION MONTHLY STATISTICAL REPORTS (Dec. 2002).
more fully track the female employment or the general unemploy-
ment rate, as shown in Charts 4 and 5.
Chart 4 compares the decline in TANF utilization between 1995
and 2000 with the rates of employment of women age sixteen and
over in 1999, as reported in the 2000 census. 2 The Chart provides
the data for the five jurisdictions that have the largest populations:
Montgomery County, Anne Arundel County, Prince George's County,
Baltimore County, and Baltimore City. Baltimore City had both the
lowest rate of female employment, at 48.8%, and the smallest decline
in TANF utilization, 54%. The remaining four jurisdictions had fe-
male employment rates between 56% and 65%. Their TANF reduc-
tion rates ranged from 69% in Baltimore County to 83% in
Montgomery County. The jurisdiction with the highest rate of female
92. See Chart 4 supra (comparing female employment and TANF caseload reductions
for the five largest Maryland jurisdictions).
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employment, Prince George's County (64.1%), experienced the third
greatest decline in TANF utilization, 74%. The jurisdiction with the
greatest decline in TANF utilization, Montgomery County (83%), has
the third highest rate of female employment, 61.9%.
CHART 5
LARGE JURISDICTIONS, COMPARING TOTAL UNEMPLOYMENT AND TANF
CASELOAD REDUCTIONS
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VESTMENT ADMINISTRATION MONTHLY STATISTICAL REPORTS (Dec. 2002).
Chart 5 compares the decline in TANF utilization between 1995
and 2000 with the unemployment rates in 2000 in the five largestjuris-
dictions.93 Once again, Baltimore City has the highest unemployment
rate and the smallest decline in TANF utilization. The two jurisdic-
tions with the lowest unemployment rates, Montgomery and Anne Ar-
undel, also experienced the greatest decline in TANF utilization. The
remaining two jurisdictions, Baltimore County and Prince George's
County, produce opposite results. The jurisdiction with the higher
unemployment rate, Prince George's (5.9%), had the larger decline
in TANF utilization (74%). The jurisdiction with the lower unemploy-
ment rate, Baltimore County (4.2%), had a smaller decline in TANF
utilization (69%).
Overall, Charts 4 and 5 demonstrate that, at least in the largest
jurisdictions, TANF utilization is more closely tied to rates of female
employment than it is to rates of unemployment. Where female em-
ployment is strong, TANF utilization usually declines to a greater de-
93. See Chart 5 supra (comparing total unemployment and TANF caseload reductions
for Maryland's largest five jurisdictions).
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gree than it does in jurisdictions where female employment is weak.
In both the larger and the smaller jurisdictions, unemployment rates
are not well correlated with TANF utilization.
Another way of examining TANF utilization is to identify what
percentage of putatively eligible families receive the benefit. One cat-
egory of families contains the highest percentage of families likely to
qualify for TANF: single-parent families with incomes below the pov-
erty line.94 The distribution of such families varies widely across Mary-
land, as shown in Chart 6.
Chart 6 contains the data collected in the 2000 census regarding
the percentage of female-headed households with minor children liv-
ing in poverty.95 Only 3.2% of the families in the State fell into that
category by the end of the economic expansion of the 1990s. In eight
counties, fewer than 2% of families met that description. In six coun-
ties, however, more than 4% of families met the description, with the
largest percentage concentrated in Baltimore City, where they consti-
tuted 11.6% of all families.
Families are eligible for cash assistance under TANF only if minor
children live in the household, and if the household has income
amounting to approximately 50% of the poverty line or less.96 Most
eligible families are headed by women living without a partner.9 7 The
census category of female-headed households with children living in
poverty, therefore, is likely to include most of the families eligible for
cash assistance under TANF. For the purpose of this analysis, these
families will be termed "putatively eligible."98
94. See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF PLANNING,
RESEARCH AND EVALUATION, CHARACTERISTICS AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF TANF RE-
CIPIENTS, October 1999-September 2000 (2004), available at http://www.ack.dhhs.gov/pro-
grams/opre/characteristics/FY2000/analysis.htm (last modified Feb. 24, 2004)
[hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, CHARACTERISTICS OF TANF RECIPI-
ENTS] (noting that two-thirds of TANF families had only one adult recipient, that TANF
families average two recipient children, and that approximately 90% of adult recipients
were women).
95. See Chart 6 supra.
96. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 7, § .03.03.11 (2004).
97. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 94. The majority of AFDC
recipients were single women parents. Id.
98. The remaining TANF-eligible households consist of children who are not living
with a parent or other impoverished relative; instead they are living with a non-parent
relative who is herself or himself not poor enough to qualify for benefits. These "child-
only" households constituted 35.13% of the caseload in 2000 (E-mail from Mark Mills-
paugh, Chief, Bureau of Information Analysis and Reporting, Family Investment Adminis-
tration, to Heather Dorsey, Research Assistant, Thurgood Marshall Law Library (Nov. 13,
2003, 11:16 EST)) (on file with author).
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Chart 7 compares, statewide and by jurisdiction, the number of
households receiving cash assistance under TANF in 2000 with the
number of putatively eligible households in the jurisdiction as re-
ported in the 2000 census.99 The comparison yields a recipiency rate,
that is, the percentage of putatively eligible households that receive
cash assistance under TANF.
As of October 2000, the jurisdiction with the highest recipiency
rate is Baltimore City, with 113%.100 Prince George's County had a
recipiency rate of 60%. Two jurisdictions, Baltimore and Charles
Counties, had recipiency rates between 50% and 59%. Threejurisdic-
tions, Garrett, Harford, and Dorchester Counties, had recipiency rates
between 40% and 49%. Eight jurisdictions had recipiency rates be-
tween 30% and 39%. The remaining eight jurisdictions had recipi-
ency rates below 30%.
Of the five largest counties, recipiency rates ranged from a high
of 113% in Baltimore City to a low of 27% in Montgomery County.
The remaining three are Prince George's County at 60%, Baltimore
County at 53%, and Anne Arundel County at 38%. Baltimore City
also has the lowest female employment rate, at 48.8%. The remaining
four large jurisdictions had rather similar female employment rates,
ranging from 58.5% in Baltimore County to 64.1% in Prince George's
County.
It seems fair to conclude from Chart 7 that, until approximately
the end of 2000, Baltimore City was delivering cash assistance under
TANF to the largest percentage of eligible families. The remaining
jurisdictions were delivering benefits to fewer putatively eligible fami-
lies. The differences among the larger jurisdictions are not explained
by differences in female employment because the recipiency rates in
those jurisdictions vary substantially more than their female employ-
ment rates vary.' ° 1
A major change appears to have occurred after October 2000.
During 2002, a bad economic year by everyone's account, the state-
wide tally of TANF cases remained constant. 11 2 Broken down byjuris-
99. See Chart 7 supra.
100. Id. The recipiency rate can exceed 100 because the TANF households include, as
explained above, both families that receive cash assistance and child-only households.
Only the households with a single-mother are included in the set of putatively eligible
households for this analysis.
101. Compare Chart 3, supra, and accompanying text, with Chart 7, supra, and
accompanying text.
102. MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, FAMILY INVESTMENT ADMINISTRA-
TION, MONTHLY STATISTICAL REPORTS: DECEMBER 2002, at 3 (2002) [hereinafter FIA Decem-
ber Report 2002].
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diction, however, the story was quite different, with the rolls rising in
sixteen jurisdictions and falling in eight.1" 3 Curiously, some of the
jurisdictions where the rolls fell were jurisdictions with poor economic
conditions, such as Baltimore City and Garrett County. 104
By the end of 2002, the largest decline in recipiency by putatively
eligible families had occurred in Baltimore City. Even though the per-
centage of putatively eligible families receiving TANF was still higher
there than elsewhere in the State, the recipiency rate fell by more
than 17%. l °5 During the same period, the recipiency rate rose in ten
Maryland jurisdictions by more than 10%."o6
The decline in TANF utilization in Baltimore City could be ex-
plained if employment opportunities in Baltimore City were better
than in the rest of the State during 2001 and 2002. Unfortunately, the
opposite held true. The unemployment rate for the State rose from
3.6% in December 2000, to 4.4% in December 2002.07 In the same
period, the rate rose in Baltimore City from 7.2% to 7.4%.108 While
the state gained a total of 58,211 jobs,10 9 Baltimore City lost 926
jobs. 10
Another possible explanation is that the poverty rate in Baltimore
City declined to the point that fewer families were in need by the end
of 2002. Unfortunately, there is no indication that the poverty rate in
Baltimore City, one of the highest in the state during the 1990s,
changed significantly between the end of 1999 and 2002.111
The decline in TANF utilization could also be explained if, de-
spite the growth in unemployment generally, adults in TANF-eligible
families were nonetheless finding employment. The employment
103. See id. at Appendix.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. DLLR MARYLAND CAREER AND WORKFORCE INFORMATION STATE STATISTICS, supra
note 79.
108. DLLR MARYLAND CAREER AND WORKFORCE INFORMATION CITY STATISTICS, supra note
85.
109. DLLR MARYLAND CAREER AND WORKFORCE INFORMATION STATE STATISTICS, supra
note 79.
110. Id.
111. Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RANKING TABLES 2000: PERCENT OF PEOPLE BELOW
POVERTY LEVEL, POPULATION FOR WHEN POVERTY STATUS IS DETERMINED (COUNTY LEVEL),
available at http://www.census.gov.acs/www/Products/Ranking/C2SS/ROITO50.htm
(noting that 22.1% of Baltimore residents lived below the poverty level), with U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, RANKING TABLES 2002: PERCENT OF PEOPLE BELOW POVERTY LEVEL, POPULATION
FOR WHEN POVERTY STATUS IS DETERMINED (COUNTY LEVEL), available at http://
www.census.gov.acs/www/Products/Ranking/2002/ROITO50.htm (stating that, in 2002,
20.6% of Baltimore residents lived below the poverty level).
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does not need to be substantial: an adult with two children who earns
approximately $650 a month makes too much money to qualify for
cash assistance under TANF in Maryland." 2 A mother with two chil-
dren earns too much to qualify for cash assistance if she works twenty-
four hours a week at minimum wage." 1 3
Whether unusually large numbers of Baltimore City's TANF-
eligible families were finding work during 2002 had not been re-
ported by the state when this Article was written. There is indirect
evidence, however, that nothing of the kind was taking place. Since
TANF-eligible families, by definition, have minor children,1 14 one
would expect to see an increase in the use of subsidized childcare if
more adults in TANF-eligible families were finding work. In Balti-
more City, however, 1103 fewer families received childcare subsidies
in 2000 than in 1995.15
Another possible explanation for the counter-cyclical decline in
TANF utilization during 2002 is that many TANF-eligible families de-
cided that they would stop trying to comply with the work require-
ments and other mandates of the cash assistance program. Instead,
families may have decided to try to "make do" on a combination of
family help and whatever work they could find, supplemented by food
stamps and Medicaid. If that strategy appealed to many families, one
would expect to find an increase in the food stamp rolls among non-
112. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 7, §§ 03.03.11, .13, .17 (2004) (stating that the monthly allowa-
ble amount to be paid for three individuals in the assistance units is $472 and that 50% of
the poverty level is $610).
113. Id. A mother working at the current Federal-Maryland minimum wage of $5.15/
hour, 24 hours/week, makes $494.40/month, putting her over the $472 monthly allowable
amount to be paid.
114. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 48(a) (2002) (stating that eligibility for assistance is
contingent upon a family including a minor child or pregnant individual).
115. FAMILY INVESTMENT ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL REPORT 2000, supra note 82, at 21. It
is possible that this could be a result of the decrease in the City's population, which de-
clined 11.5% from 1990 to 2000. DHR FACT PACK 2002, supra note 43, at 61. This decline
may or may not have taken place in the population eligible for child care subsidies. A
decline in the eligible population seems unlikely, however, as the number of middle-
income and upper-middle-income households (those earning between $34,000 and$81,000 a year) declined by 17,000 in Baltimore during the 1990s, and median household
income in Baltimore declined over the decade by 7% (now ranking 87th lowest among the
top 100 cities). The Brookings Institution, Living Cities: Baltimore in Focus: A Profile
from Census 2000 (2003), available at http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/livingcities/
baltimore.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2004). Baltimore County, alone among the remaining
23 jurisdictions, joined Baltimore City in having fewer families receive a childcare subsidy
in 2000 than in 1995. DHR FACT PACK 2002, supra note 43, at 21. The other majority
African-American county, Prince George's, showed an increase of only 70%. Id. That
sounds high except that the median change in utilization was an increase of 100%; of the
counties at or above the median, none has an African-American population of more than
41%. Id.
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welfare families at the same time that there is a decrease in the TANF
rolls. During 2002, however, the jurisdictions with the largest TANF
rolls in 2000 did not consistently experience the opposite movement
in their food stamp rolls.'1
6
CHART 8
CHANGES IN TCA AND FS-NPA UTILIZATION, 2002
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MD. DEP'T HUM. RESOURCES, FAMILY INVESTMENT ADMINISTRATION MONTHLY STA-
TISTiCAL REPORTS (Jan. and Dec. 2002).
Chart 8 compares the change, over the course of 2002, in the
number of households receiving cash assistance under TANF and the
number of households receiving only food stamps.' 17 The chart pro-
vides data for the ten jurisdictions with the largest populations in or-
der of the decline each jurisdiction experienced in the utilization of
cash assistance under TANF. The degree of change is a figure arrived
at by comparing the number of households receiving each of the ben-
efits in January 2002 with the number receiving the same benefit in
December 2002, according to statistics published by the State Depart-
ment of Human Resources." 8
As shown in Chart 8, three jurisdictions experienced a decline in
cash assistance cases: Baltimore County, Baltimore City, and Mont-
gomery County. The rate of decline ranges from 8% in Baltimore
116. See Chart 8 infra (comparing changes in households receiving temporary cash assis-
tance with households receiving only food stamps).
117. See Chart 8 supra.
118. See FIA DECEMBER REPORT 2002, supra note 102, at Appendix.
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County to 4% in Montgomery County. The remaining seven counties
experienced an increase in cash assistance cases. The rate of increase
ranges from 13% in Prince George's County to 23% in Cecil County.
Five counties experienced a decline in food stamp cases: Baltimore
City, Frederick County, Wicomico County, Charles County, and Cecil
County. In Baltimore City, 8% fewer people received food stamps at
the end of 2002 than at the beginning. In the remaining four coun-
ties, between 13% and 15% fewer people received food stamps at the
end of the year than at the beginning. Of the five counties that exper-
ienced an increase in food stamp cases, Frederick and Baltimore
County had increases of 15% and 16%, respectively. Anne Arundel
County's rolls increased by 19%, while Montgomery and Prince
George's Counties experienced increases of, respectively, 25% and
30%.
A decline in TANF utilization is mirrored by an increase in food
stamp utilization in only two jurisdictions, Baltimore County and
Montgomery County. In Baltimore City, both TANF and food stamp
utilization declined. In the remaining seven jurisdictions, usage of
both TANF and food stamps increased, but there is no consistent pat-
tern in the degree of increase in one to the other.
To sum up, since January 1997, when welfare reform began in
Maryland, residents of differentjurisdictions have had different exper-
iences in accessing cash assistance under TANF. 19 Until 2000, re-
sidents of Baltimore City were most likely to receive cash assistance
under TANF. 2 ° Since 2000, the recipiency rate in Baltimore City de-
clined without offsetting increases in food stamp utilization.' 2 ' Re-
sidents of the four counties with the largest populations have widely
varying degrees of utilization of cash assistance. 1 22 Some of the varia-
tion, at least in the largest jurisdictions, may be related to differences
in female employment rates.'12  Unemployment rates do not appear
to be related to the variability. 124
2. Welfare Avoidance Grant (WAG).-Maryland's FIP statute re-
quires that every applicant and recipient must be assessed to deter-
119. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
120. See Chart 7 supra and accompanying discussion.
121. See Chart 8 supra and accompanying discussion.
122. See Chart 5 supra and accompanying text (indicating that Baltimore City, Montgom-
ery County, Prince George's County, Baltimore County, and Anne Arundel County com-
prise the five largest jurisdictions in Maryland).
123. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text; see also Charts 3-4 supra and
accompanying text.
124. See Chart 2 supra and accompanying discussion.
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mine his or her reasons for needing assistance, employability, and
personal and family resources.' 25 In appropriate cases, an applicant
or recipient should be awarded a welfare avoidance grant (WAG)
rather than monthly cash assistance. 126 The grant is an amount
equivalent to between three and twelve months of assistance, and it is
designed to "[m]eet immediate needs so that an applicant or recipi-
ent can avoid welfare assistance. 1 27 For example, if a person has ajob
offer but cannot get to the job because her car needs to be repaired, a
WAG could be awarded for the repair costs and the applicant or recip-
ient would be able to avoid further welfare assistance.'
28 Another ap-
plicant or recipient might need money for a uniform required by an
employer, or she might need money for books to finish a course that
will lead immediately to employment.
129
According to the State Plan, every component of FIP is available
in every jurisdiction, although the local department can "tailor" the
requirements and procedures.1 ° Whether WAGs are available in
every jurisdiction, however, is highly questionable, as Chart 9 demon-
strates about WAGs awarded in 2000.1"
The darker columns in Chart 9 indicate the percentage of TANF
recipients living in each jurisdiction in 2000. The lighter columns in-
dicate the percentage of WAGs awarded in that jurisdiction. The per-
centage of all WAGs awarded during FY 2000 in the various
jurisdictions varies, from a high of nearly 20% in St. Mary's County to
a low of .22% in Dorchester County.
More telling, in terms of geographic differences, is the compari-
son between the percentage of WAGs awarded in a particular jurisdic-
tion with the percentage of TANF recipients residing in that
jurisdiction. That comparison indicates the likelihood that any indi-
vidual will be awarded a WAG. The likelihood varies from approxi-
mately one out of two in the counties that frequently award WAGs to
zero in three jurisdictions: Baltimore City, Prince George's County,
and Dorchester County.
125. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 49(a)(1) (2003).
126. Id.§ 49(a)(2).
127. Id. § 49(a) (2) (i).
128. FAMILY INVESTMENT PROGRAM LEGAL CLINIC STATUS REPORT, supra note 41, at 19.
129. SOP #02-01, supra note 31, at 3-4.
130. STATE OF MARYLAND, DEPARTMENT OF HuMAN RESOURCES, FAMILY INVESTMENT AD-
MINISTRATION, TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF) STATE PlAN 1 (Oct. 1,
2002), available at http://www.dhr.state.md.us/fia/doc/tanfplan.pdf [hereinafter TANF
STATE PLAN].
131. See Chart 9 infra (graphing WAG utilization by county for 2000).
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CHART 9
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MD. DEP'T HUM. RESOURCES, FILY INVESTMENT ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL RE-PORTS (2000); Data provided by Mark Millspaugh, FIA, to Yoanna MoisidesJuly 2001,
on file with author.
Given the wide variability and the claim that double devolution
allows for tailoring "to fit the unique population of the jurisdic-
tion,"1 32 one question is whether some important difference among
the jurisdictions explains the differences in WAG awards. The most
important difference, given that welfare reform is about moving peo-
ple from welfare to work,1 33 should involve employment conditions.
Because a principal purpose of a WAG is to assist an applicant or re-
cipient to become employed, it would appear that jurisdictions with
high unemployment should put little emphasis on awarding WAGs.
Because few applicants and recipients would be likely to get ajob in a
place of high unemployment, few would need a WAG to cover an ex-
pense that opens the door to a job. The opposite should hold true
where unemployment is low. In FY 2000, however, logic held only at
the extremes, as Chart 10 demonstrates. 34
Chart 10 cor-pares the unemploymedit rates in 2000 with the rate
at which recipients are awarded a WAG in the six jurisdictions that
have the highest and lowest WAG award rates. The two jurisdictions
132. TANF STATE PLAN, supra note 130, at 1.
133. Id. at i.
134. See Chart 10 infra.
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CHART 10
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MD. DEP'T PLANNING, Variables from "Table DP-3. Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics: 2000," on file with author, MD. DEP'T HUM. RESOURCES, THE FAMILY
INVESTMENT ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL REPORT (2000); Data provided by Mark
Millspaugh, FIA, to Yoanna Moisides, July 2001, on file with author.
with the highest and lowest unemployment rates, Carroll County and
Baltimore City, also have the highest and lowest rates of awarding
WAGs. In the two jurisdictions where few WAGs were awarded, the
unemployment rate was 5.8% and 5.9%. One of the two remaining
high-award jurisdictions experienced an unemployment rate of only
4.5%, while the other one experienced a high unemployment rate of
6.8%.
In sum, and assuming that the unemployment rate is related to
the existence of job opportunities, WAGs are awarded or not awarded
in at least four jurisdictions without much of a relationship to the like-
lihood of employment. In only two jurisdictions, the ones with the
most extreme unemployment and WAG statistics, did unemployment
and the availability of a WAG appear to show a relationship. An assess-
ment by local departments about the employment prospects of their
applicants and recipients does not, therefore, appear to explain the
variability in WAG award practices.
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Another possible explanation for variation in WAG awards from
one jurisdiction to another is that some jurisdictions may use WAGs as
a common alternative to the approval of a monthly cash assistance
grant.13 5 In these jurisdictions, one would expect to see caseworkers
operating in much the same way that the welfare statute appears to
require. He or she would do an assessment of what keeps an appli-
cant from finding or keeping employment. If the problem is one that
could be solved by an infusion of some cash, then the applicant
should be offered a WAG rather than automatically approved for cash
assistance.1 36 Many recipients of cash assistance receive a grant for a
relatively brief period of time, ' so it may be the case that many can
avoid using cash assistance altogether if an appropriate assessment is
made at the time of application. Others cannot become immediately
employed or avoid imminent unemployment, even with an infusion of
cash, and an appropriate assessment should identify their need for
cash assistance. In jurisdictions undertaking accurate assessments,
there should be a balance of some kind between cases in which tem-
porary cash assistance (TCA) is approved and cases in which WAGs
are awarded. In the jurisdictions where a less substantive and accurate
assessment is performed, one would expect to see a greater imbalance
between cases in which TCA is awarded and those in which WAGs are
awarded.
A comparison of TCA approval rates and WAG awards in fact
shows that some jurisdictions appear to assess applicants simultane-
ously for WAGs and for monthly grants, while others appear to ignore
the possibility of awarding a WAG altogether.'38 During 2002, the
twelve jurisdictions with the highest TCA application approval rates
were also among the group ofjurisdictions which provided applicants
and recipients with a zero percent chance of receiving a WAG during
2000. t13 All of the jurisdictions in which applicants and recipients
stood any chance of being awarded a WAG during 2000 were among
135. See TANF STATE PLAN, supra note 130, at 1 (noting that a WAG is based on an
agreement between the recipient and the local jurisdiction according to criteria deter-
mined by the local department).
136. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 49(a)(2) (2003).
137. See CATHERINE E. BORN, SETTING THE BASELINE: PATTERNS OF RECIDIVISM IN MARy-
LAND UNDER AFDC 17 (Family Welfare Research and Training Group, Setting the Baseline
Series 1998), available at http://www.familywelfare.umaryland.edu/publications2.htm (last
visited Feb. 23, 2004) (noting that almost half of a sample of welfare recipients required an
initial infusion of cash assistance for less than twelve months).
138. Compare Chart 9 with Chart 8 supra.
139. Compare FIA December Report 2002, supra note 102, at app., with Chart 9 supra.
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the twelve jurisdictions with the lowest TCA application approval rates
during 2002.140
Given the racialized histories of AFDC and TANF,141 it is also use-
ful to see whether WAG awards correlate with the race of residents of
the counties in which people have the greatest and least opportunities
to be awarded a WAG. As Chart 11 shows, the correlation between the
racial composition of the county and the likelihood of getting a WAG
is much closer than the correlation between unemployment rates and
WAG awards.1
42
CHART 11
WAGS AND AFRICAN-AMERICAN RESIDENTS
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MD. DEP'T PLANNING, Variables from "Table DP-3. Profile of Selected Economic
Characteristics: 2000," on file with author, MD. DEP'T HUM. RESOURCES, THE FAMILY
INVESTMENT ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL REPORT (2000); Data provided by Mark
Millspaugh, FIA, to Yoanna Moisides, July 2001, on file with author.
Chart 11 compares the percentage of African-American residents
in the jurisdiction with the rate at which WAGs are awarded to re-
sidents of the jurisdiction. Data is provided as to the six counties with
the highest and lowest WAG award rates. Baltimore City, Prince
George's County, and Dorchester County, the three jurisdictions with
the lowest WAG award rates, have higher percentages of African-
American residents than the three jurisdictions (Carroll, St. Mary's,
140. Id.
141. Naomi R. Cahn, Representing Race Outside of Explicitly Racialized Contexts, 95 MIcH. L.
REV. 965, 965-70 (1997) (arguing that race plays a role in numerous aspects of welfare
programs, specifically in AFDC and TANF).
142. Compare Chart 11 infra (comparing the percentage of African-American residents
with the likelihood of receiving a WAG), with Chart 10 supra.
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and Worcester Counties) with the highest WAG award rates. Balti-
more City and Prince George's County are the only two majority Afri-
can-American jurisdictions in the State. At 28% African-American
residents, Dorchester County has the fourth-highest percentage of Af-
rican-American residents in the State. The three jurisdictions with the
highest WAG award rates, Carroll, St. Mary's, and Worcester Counties,
have between 2% and 17% African-American residents.
As startling as it may be, the correlation of WAG award rates and
African-American residents is close to perfect: the greater the percent-
age of African-American residents the jurisdiction has, the less likely it
is that a WAG will be awarded. In fact, of the four jurisdictions with
the highest African-American populations, three are in the group that
award so few WAGs that the likelihood of getting one is zero. This
pattern harkens back to AFDC conduct, where states and localities
with the highest African-American populations usually also had the
least generous and most restrictive AFDC programs. 4
3. Domestic Violence.-WAGs are only one component among
many in FIP. Another feature of FIP is that applicants and recipients
who are subject to domestic violence may be excused from certain
program requirements if that is necessary in order for them to leave
the situation in which the abuse occurs. 144
The connections between domestic violence and family poverty
are profound. Studies of welfare recipients indicate that more than a
third experienced domestic violence within the last year. 145 TANF re-
quirements about seeking independence through work and collecting
child support may increase the dangerousness of present and former
partners.1 46 In light of these concerns, Maryland elected an option
under TANF to provide special treatment for recipients subject to or
threatened with domestic violence.' 47
143. Schram & Soss, supra note 35, at 194; see also Cahn, supra note 141, at 974-75 (dis-
cussing state morality requirements and their disproportionate impact on African Ameri-
cans and noting the institution of a federal cooperation requirement given the large
number of poor African-American women denied AFDC benefits).
144. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 7, § .03.03.07(I)(4)(f) (2004).
145. ANDREA HETLINC-WERNYJ & CATHERINE E. BORN, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND WELFARE
RECEIPT IN MARYLAND: ARE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VicTiMs DIFFERENT FROM OTHER WELFARE
RECIPIENTS? 3 (2002).
146. Richard M. Tolman & Jody Raphael, A Review of Research on Welfare and Domestic
Violence, 56J. Soc. ISSUEs 655, 655 (2000), available at http://www.ssw.umich.edu/trapped/
jsi-tolmanfinal.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 615 (2000); MD. REGS. CODE tit. 7, § 03.03.07 (I)(4)(f) (2004).
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It is not easy for a social services bureaucracy to identify or to
provide services to women who are subject to domestic violence.' 48
There is often a history of distrust between social services caseworkers
and people in the community served by the programs. 14' Domestic
violence is an area about which many victims experience a sense of
shame. 150 At a practical level, parents are concerned that social ser-
vice workers might initiate a child abuse or neglect proceeding in re-
sponse to a report of domestic violence.' 5 ' Further, the services that
are offered may not respond to a particular family's situation.
52
These among other factors tend to depress the numbers of TANF
cases in which domestic violence is identified. In Maryland, only
5.12% of recipients have disclosed a history of domestic violence to
the agency.'1 3 Of those, only 0.31% received an exemption from a
program requirement.
54
Although there is no reason to believe that any one jurisdiction
would have a higher incidence of domestic violence than any other
jurisdiction, the rate of identifications is not consistent across the
State, as Chart 12 shows.
155
Chart 12 compares the percentage of cash assistance recipients in
the jurisdiction who have been identified in administrative records as
experiencing family violence with the percentage of cash assistance
recipients in the State who reside in thatjurisdiction. Data is provided
for the twelve jurisdictions with the largest number of TANF recipi-
ents. The rate of identification ranges from 7.79% in Dorchester
County to 0.1% in Baltimore City. Three jurisdictions identified be-
tween 5% and 7% of recipients. Five jurisdictions identified between
2% and 4.9% of recipients. The three remaining jurisdictions identi-
fied fewer than 2% of recipients. The percentage of identified re-
sidents is highest in those jurisdictions in which 3% or fewer of the
State's cash assistance recipients reside. The percentage of identified
148. HETLING-WERNYJ & BORN, supra note 145, at 33 (noting that domestic violence rep-
resents a significant barrier to many on welfare, but that only very few women are actually
identified as domestic violence victims).
149. See Czapanskiy, supra note 29, at 461-62 (noting the inherent conflict caseworkers
deal with in trying to keep some people off welfare, yet at the same time identifying and
helping others who need welfare assistance).
150. JODY RAPHAEL, SAVING BERNICE: BATTERED WOMEN, WELFARE, AND POVERTY 5, 126
(2000) (noting the feeling of shame that domestic violence victims experience).
151. Czapanskiy, supra note 29, at 455.
152. Id. at 460-61.
153. See HETLINC-WERNYJ & BORN, supra note 145, at 10 (the 5.12% includes victims not
administratively marked, but whose representations indicate domestic violence).
154. Id.
155. See Chart 12 infra (outlining FVO identifications by jurisdiction).
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LENCE VICTIMS DIFFERENT FROM OTHER WELFARE RECIPIENTS? (2002).
recipients is lowest in those jurisdictions in which 7% or more of the
State's cash assistance recipients reside.
The likelihood of being identified as a TANF recipient subject to
domestic violence is not high in any jurisdiction. In Baltimore City,
Prince George's County, and Baltimore County, however, the likeli-
hood approaches zero. The size of the caseload in the jurisdiction
appears to matter: two of the jurisdictions with the worst records are
also the jurisdictions with the largest caseloads. This points to the pos-
sibility that assessment practices in those two jurisdictions may be
problematic.
Another troubling issue concerning family violence identification
is the correlation between the likelihood of identification and the ra-
cial composition of the population of the jurisdiction. Chart 13 com-
pares the likelihood that a person is identified as needing family
violence option services with the percentage of African-American re-
sidents in the jurisdictions. 56 The likelihood of being identified ex-
ceeded .01 in every jurisdiction where African Americans are in the
minority, except for Baltimore County. Residents of the two jurisdic-
tions with majority African-American populations had the lowest
chances of being identified as needing family violence option services.
156. See Chart 13 infra.
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(2002).
4. Post-Welfare Employment.-Another way to compare Maryland's
jurisdictions is to compare some of the characteristics of former recip-
ients. For example, if recipients in a particular jurisdiction leave wel-
fare, get employed and stay employed, the jurisdiction is likely to be
counted as a success.
The State does not publish full data about post-welfare employ-
ment broken down by jurisdiction. Limited data has been published
concerning post-welfare employment in Baltimore City and Prince
George's County.1 5 7 The data on the other twenty-two jurisdictions is
not broken down by jurisdiction."'8 The data overstates employment
157. LIFE AFTER WELFARE: FIFTH REPORT 17, 41 WELFARE AND CHILD SUPPORT RESEARCH
AND TRAINING GROUP (Life After Welfare Series 2000), available at http://
www.familywelfare.umaryland.edu/reports/life5.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2004) [hereinaf-
ter LIFE AFTER WELFARE, FIFTH REPORT] (noting a spike in case closings in Baltimore City
and Prince George's County, most of which were largely recorded as "failed to reapply").
158. Id. at 41.
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in Baltimore City and Baltimore County. 5 9 Nonetheless, the data
helps identify some trends.
In 1997, the first full year of welfare reform, 57% of Baltimore
City's existing welfare recipients had jobs during the first quarter after
exit, a higher percentage than in Prince George's County (40%) or
the average of the other twenty-two jurisdictions (54%).160
The employment success of Baltimore City's recipients in the first
year was predictable to some degree because Baltimore City's rolls in-
cluded the highest percentage of recipients with a pre-exit history of
employment: 72% for Baltimore City, compared with 56% for Prince
George's County and 66% in the rest of the State.' 6' Given that peo-
ple with an employment history are usually more employable than
those without an employment history, it is likely that the employment
successes in Baltimore City in 1997 should be attributed to the charac-
teristics and efforts of the recipients and the state of the economy,
rather than to the welfare program.
The success of the first year has not been replicated. In 1998,
51% of welfare leavers from Baltimore City were employed in the first
quarter after leaving welfare, compared with 37% of leavers from
Prince George's County, and 52% of those from the other jurisdic-
tions.16 2 In 1999, Baltimore City's employment rate was down to 46%,
while Prince George's rate rose to 34% and the rest of the jurisdic-
tions averaged 49%.163 In 2000, 50% of Baltimore City's and 47% of
159. Employment data reported by the state are compiled based on employer reports to
the state's unemployment insurance database (Maryland Automated Benefits System, or
MABS). PAMELA CAUDILL OVWIGHO ET AL., LIFE AFTER WELFARE: SEVENTH REPORT 8-9 (Fam-
ily Welfare Research and Training Group, Life After Welfare Series (2002)), available at
http://www.familywelfare.umaryland.edu/reports/life7.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2004)
[hereinafter LIFE AFTER WELFARE: SEVENTH REPORT]. While this is a standard practice
among welfare researchers, it has particular implications for Maryland. MABS data does
not include employment obtained in states outside of Maryland or with the federal govern-
ment. I& Because Baltimore City is located relatively far from the State's borders and
places where federal jobs are numerous, residents of Baltimore City are less likely to be
employed in a type of employment not reported to MABS than residents of much of the
rest of the State. Thus, employment statistics relying on MABS are likely to over-represent
employment in Baltimore City. One study found, for example, that "1% or less of Balti-
more City exiters work out-of-state in any given quarter. In contrast, 4.8% (quarter of exit)
to 10.5% (sixteenth quarter after exit) of exiters from Maryland's 23 counties are em-
ployed in a border state or the District of Columbia." Id. at A-70. Of the five largest juris-
dictions in the State, Baltimore City and Baltimore County have the fewest residents
employed out of state (1.9% and 2%, respectively). Id. at 10. Montgomery County and
Prince George's County have the most, with 32.1% and 44.9%, respectively. Id.
160. See LIFE AFrER WELFARE: FIFTH REPORT, supra note 157, at 41.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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Prince George's County's post-exit families were employed in the first
quarter after exit, compared to 53% in the rest of the State.' 64
Baltimore City's relatively high post-welfare unemployment is
noteworthy for two reasons. First, the employment of its residents is
likely to be over-reported relative to three of the other large jurisdic-
tions in the State, so the difference is greater than it appears. 165 Sec-
ond, the percentage of exiting recipients with a prior employment
history is nearly as high in Baltimore City as it is in the rest of the State
(71% compared with 73%, respectively, in 2000),166 and prior employ-
ment usually is a predictor of good employment prospects for former
welfare recipients. 167 Apparently, the predictor works differently in
Baltimore City than in the rest of the State; the question is why.
Further, getting off of welfare and staying off are not the same.
As one researcher in Maryland has said, "[o]ur data are consistent
with other research documenting a high level of work experience or
effort among welfare recipients .... Together these findings strongly
suggest that welfare recipients do not have the greatest difficulty get-
ting a job; rather, job retention and advancement are the keys to self-
sufficiency."' 68 On this measure, Baltimore City's experience is rather
worse than that of the rest of the State.'61 Despite the higher employ-
ment rates of exiting recipients in Baltimore City initially, former re-
cipients returned to the rolls at higher rates in Baltimore City than
elsewhere in the State. 170 By the time welfare reform had been in
place for thirty-six months, 43% of exiting families from Baltimore
City had returned to the rolls, compared to 39% elsewhere in the
State. 171 People from Baltimore City who left welfare in the second
year had an even higher rate of returning to the rolls: 54% after two
years, compared to 48% in the rest of the State.172 By the end of the
fourth year of welfare reform, 41% of the Baltimore City exiting fami-
164. CATHERINE E. BORN ET AL., LIFE AFTER WELFARE: SIXTH REPORT 39 (Welfare and
Child Support Research and Training Group, Life After Welfare Series 2001), available at
http://www.familywelfare.umaryland.edu/reports/life 7 .pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2004)
[hereinafter LIFE AFTER WELFARE: SIXTH REPORT].
165. See LIFE AFTER WELFARE: SEVENTH REPORT, supra note 159, at 10 (noting the high
percentage of Cecil, Montgomery, and Prince George's County residents who work outside
of the state).
166. LIFE AFTER WELFARE: SIXTH REPORT, supra note 164, at 39.
167. Id. at 33.
168. Id. at 28.
169. Id. at 52, 54.
170. See id. at 54 (noting that after one year "Baltimore City residents returned to cash
assistance at a higher rate than their peers in other jurisdictions").
171. LIFE AFTER WELFARE: FIFTH REPORT, supra note 157, at 57.
172. Id.
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lies had returned to welfare, while only 29% had done so elsewhere in
the State. 173 Like WAGs and family violence identification, the short
duration of employment achieved by welfare leavers in Baltimore City
may indicate that applicants and recipients are not given careful as-
sessments. Good assessments, based on accurate knowledge about the
applicant and available employment, could be helpful in creating a
more durable match of employer and employee. Alternatively, a good
assessment might help the caseworker to identify a job preparation
program or training opportunity that would help the recipient
achieve more durable employment.1 74
5. Summation.-How a family in Maryland experiences welfare
reform probably depends on where the family lives and when the fam-
ily was in need of help. If the family sought help in Baltimore City
before October 2000, the family was more likely to be awarded cash
assistance than was true elsewhere in the State.'75 There was, at the
same time, little likelihood that the family would receive the kind of
assessment that would lead to an offer of a welfare avoidance grant,
family violence option services, or a job that the parent could keep
over the long haul. 176 After October 2000, the likelihood that the
family would be awarded cash assistance declined somewhat in Balti-
more City, while it rose in most of the other jurisdictions. 177 Unlike
the other two jurisdictions experiencing a continuing decline in the
cash assistance rolls, Baltimore City had no complementary increase
in food stamps utilization. 178
All twenty-four jurisdictions in the State reduced the number of
people relying on cash assistance under TANF between 1995 and
2000.179 Among the largest five jurisdictions, the decline in the cash
assistance rolls correlates with rates of female employment and gen-
eral unemployment in the jurisdiction. 0 Jurisdictions with the high-
est rates of female employment and the lowest rates of unemployment
173. LIFE AFTER WELFARE: SIXTH REPORT, supra note 164, at 52.
174. See ROBERT MOFFIT ET AL., WELFARE, CHILDREN & FAMILIES: A THREE-CITY STUDY:
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILIES REMAINING ON WELFARE, POLICY BRIEF 02-02, at 3 (2002),
available at http://www.jhu.edu/-welfare/19505(19459)Welfare-Brief.pdf (last visited Feb.
26, 2004) (noting the importance of sustainable employment for the economic well-being
of an individual transitioning from welfare).
175. See Chart 9 supra.
176. See Chart 10 supra (likelihood of WAG award) and Chart 13 (likelihood of FVO
identification).
177. See supra notes 102-110 and accompanying text.
178. See Chart 8 supra.
179. See Chart I supra.
180. See Chart 2 and Chart 3 supra.
[VOL. 63:655
WELFARE REFORM, EQUAL PROTECTION
experienced the highest rates of decline in the cash assistance rolls.'
Baltimore City, with the lowest rate of female employment and the
highest rate of unemployment, experienced the smallest rate of de-
cline in the cash assistance rolls.'
8 2
Welfare reform in Maryland promises individual assessments of
each family leading to individually tailored plans to help the family
leave welfare.183 Two components of the program are welfare avoid-
ance grants and family violence option services.' 4 Jurisdictions where
WAGs are awarded frequently are also the jurisdictions with some of
the lowest approval rates for the alternative of a monthly cash assis-
tance award."8 5 This pattern may mean that assessments in those juris-
dictions are done with an awareness of the multiple paths that a family
may take to leave welfare. If that is the case, families in those jurisdic-
tions may have a better chance than families in some other jurisdic-
tions of getting help that is responsive to their needs as they make the
transition into relying on employment for a larger share of family
income.
At the same time, it is important to be aware that awards of WAGs
as well as identifications of families for family violence option services
correlate with the racial composition of the jurisdiction.' 6 Jurisdic-
tions with the lowest WAG award and FVO identification rates are the
same jurisdictions in which a majority of residents are African Ameri-
cans.' 87 Differential access to program benefits depending on the ra-
cial composition of the jurisdiction is a phenomenon with a troubling
AFDC history that may be getting replicated under TANF. 88 Further,
poor assessment practices may be most harmful to people who may
experience race-based discrimination in employment.
Finally, there is the issue of post-welfare employment. Although
Baltimore City appears to have a good post-welfare employment rate,
it is overstated because of the way in which the statistics are gener-
ated.'8 9 When compared with the percentage of the adults on the
rolls who had a pre-welfare employment history, the employment rate
181. See Chart 4 supra.
182. Id.
183. TANF STATE PLAN, supra note 130, at 1.
184. See id. (outlining welfare avoidance grants); Czapanskiy, supra note 29, at 447 (out-
lining the family violence option).
185. See Chart 9 and Chart 10 supra.
186. See Chart 11 supra and Chart 13 supra.
187. See Chart 11 supra and Chart 13 supra.
188. Schram & Soss, supra note 35, at 194.
189. See supra note 159 (discussing the method of calculating the employment data).
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is less impressive.19 Further, Baltimore City residents have a harder
time remaining employed and staying off welfare than residents of
other jurisdictions. 19
The differences that families experience do not arise from a sin-
gle source. Where local administrators are faced with small caseloads,
they may do a better job of assessing the needs of each family and
providing better assistance to the heads of those families to find a way
to become and stay employed or find other supportive resources such
as Supplemental Security Income, food stamps, or child care vouch-
ers. Where the locality has an abundance of jobs for women with chil-
dren and adequate childcare facilities, families face less need for cash
assistance and can be diverted more readily into employment. On the
other hand, a location such as Baltimore City has a large caseload and
poor employment prospects for women with children. Local adminis-
trators in such a situation face quite different challenges. And the
distressing reality must be faced that families living in majority Afri-
can-American jurisdictions are likely to have less access to welfare
avoidance grants and to services for family violence. 1
92
Double devolution provides the opportunities for local adminis-
trators to treat families differently solely on the basis of where they
live.' 9 3 Maryland's administrative decision to delegate program de-
sign decisions to local departments has enabled administrators in
twenty-four separate offices to decide whether to emphasize or de-
emphasize various aspects of the benefits and services. 194 The pur-
pose of double devolution was to make it possible for locally based
administrators to use their knowledge of local resources and needs to
design a program "tailored to fit the unique population of the juris-
diction."'19 5 Local administrators, however, are not required to show
how their plans achieve that goal.1 96 Even if they were, it is difficult to
determine how local conditions vary so much that, in some jurisdic-
tions, it is close to impossible for a victim of domestic violence to be
identified. 197
190. LIFE AFTER WELFARE: SEVENTH REPORT, supra note 159, at 54.
191. See supra notes 162-164 and accompanying text (discussing Baltimore City's high
unemployment rate compared to the rest of the State).
192. See Chart 11 supra (WAGs and African Americans) and Chart 13 supra (FVO and
African Americans).
193. See Diller, supra note 20, at 1148-49 (noting the types of discretionary decisions
caseworkers make).
194. TANF STATE PLAN, supra note 130, at 1.
195. Id.
196. See generally id.
197. See Chart 12 supra (outlining FVO identifications by jurisdiction).
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One distinct pattern appears to emerge from the data. More
than the other jurisdictions, Baltimore City continued to perform
much as it had before welfare reform until approximately the middle
of 2001. That is, the utilization rate for TANF-funded cash assistance
remained extremely high, suggesting that the principal eligibility cri-
teria remained financial rather than non-financial, such as preparing
for employment. The likelihood that applicants and recipients would
have access to some of the new elements of welfare reform, such as
welfare avoidance grants and family violence option services, was
lower in Baltimore City than elsewhere. More families in Baltimore
City were on the rolls for most of the time afterJanuary 1997, so there
were more families approaching their sixty-month time limit for feder-
ally funded cash assistance by the beginning of 2002.
It also appears that, toward the end of 2000, a change began.
The principal evidence of the change is the steep decline in the utili-
zation rate for cash assistance under TANF.198 There is no evidence
that the decline was the product of fewer people applying for benefits
or being approved for benefits; Baltimore's approval rate for new ap-
plications remained one of the highest in the State during 2002.19
Nor is there much evidence that Baltimore residents were suddenly
being placed in more useful work-preparation programs or that they
were becoming more successful in finding long-term employment. 200
The change seems to be the product, instead, of people being pushed
into leaving the rolls as they approached the federal time limit of sixty
months.
Where a family lives should not be the basis for a decision about
whether the family needs cash assistance, whether the family should
be found eligible for a WAG or family violence option services, or
whether the adult in the family should engage in one or another activ-
ity to prepare for employment. Those decisions should be made
based on the individual situation and resources of the individual fam-
ily. Double devolution has played a role in making it possible for fam-
ilies to be treated differently solely on the basis of where they live.
The remaining question is whether the geographic discrimination
198. See FIA DECEMBER REPORT 2002, supra note 102, at app.
199. Id. at 3 (noting in Table 2 that Baltimore City only trailed Prince George's County
in TANF applications approved).
200. See LWE AFTER WELFARE: SEVENTH REPORT, supra note 159, at 54 (noting the high
rate of Baltimore City leavers returning to cash assistance).
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that results from double devolution can be the subject of a constitu-
tional claim under the State's constitution. °1
II. LEGAL THEORIES
When Maryland's Department of Human Resources decided to
delegate authority to the local departments to design as well as to im-
plement welfare reform, it opened the door to two possibilities. Local
department officials could study local conditions and create programs
designed to meet the specific economic and employment conditions
of the locality. Alternatively, local department officials could create
programs based on the beliefs and biases of program managers that
might or might not relate to local conditions. In the former case,
welfare recipients in different parts of the State would be treated dif-
ferently from one another, but the purposes served by the differential
treatment could be justified. In the latter case, welfare recipients
would be treated differently, but the differences would not appear to
have a connection to local differences. The differences described in
Part II of this Article seem to be of the second sort: differences in
treatment do not appear to be based on the existence of particular
local employment conditions or community practices. 20 2 Assuming
that the same conclusion would be produced in litigation, what legal
theory might be the basis for relief? And what relief would be
constructive?
Federal constitutional doctrine offers little promise. No federal
constitutional right to subsistence has been recognized. 203 Equal pro-
tection claims involving economic and social programs are subject
only to a rational basis standard,20 4 which is easy to satisfy. If the evi-
dence were to show that people of color get worse treatment than
European-Americans, no federal constitutional claim could be made
in the absence of intentional discrimination. 2 5 Federal civil rights
statutory claims might be made on the basis of race discrimination
201. See, e.g., Verzi v. Baltimore County, 333 Md. 411, 427, 635 A.2d 967, 974-75 (1994)
(holding that a Baltimore County Code provision that geographically discriminated against
out of county tow operators violated the State's constitutional guarantee of equal
protection).
202. See supra Part I.B.1-4 (summarizing Maryland's welfare reform experiences).
203. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-88 (1970) (upholding regulation
capping AFDC benefits at $250 per month regardless of actual need or family size).
204. See id. (applying the rational basis standard).
205. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1976) (requiring more evidence
of racial discrimination than a statistically disproportionate impact).
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and disability discrimination. 20 6 But the Supreme Court's federalism
jurisprudence jeopardizes some oppoftunities for states to be held lia-
ble for such violations, 0 7 and the regulatory procedures hold rela-
tively little promise for complete remediation.2 ° s
A useful source of law may be the state constitution. Two possible
theories, both grounded in the equal protection guarantee of Article
24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 20 hold promise. The first
theory addresses location discrimination in the welfare program, ap-
plying a "rational basis with bite" test.21 0 The second theory proposes
applying a heightened scrutiny test to the location discrimination
claim on the basis that everyone who is or may be eligible for welfare
is a member of a vulnerable group on the basis of gender, age, race or
disability.211
A. Rational Basis with Bite
Traditionally, economic and social welfare regulations are re-
viewed under a rational basis test, and the government's classification
is usually sustained. 2  Since 1993, however, the Court of Appeals of
206. 42 U.S.C. § 608(d) (2000); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (2003); 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.4, 84.52
(2003); see also, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1980) (finding a constitutional
claim based solely on statutory provisions of AFDC).
207. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 747 (2002)
(holding that state sovereign immunity precluded the Federal Maritime Commission from
adjudicating a complaint that a state-run port violated the Shipping Act of 1984); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that sovereign immunity prevented suit in state
court against the State of Maine for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1928).
208. States are required not to discriminate in various ways when spending federal
funds, but discriminating on the basis of one's residence is explicitly permitted under
TANF. Administrative penalty procedures should be useful to remedy other discriminatory
practices, but limited resources are available for compliance reviews and to adjudicate
complaints. For example, The Office of Civil Rights of Health and Human Services under-
took a compliance review in 2001 concerning whether TANF applicants and recipients in
Maryland experienced unlawful discrimination on the basis of disability. Letter from Paul
F. Cushing, Regional Manager, Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Civil
Rights, to Emelda P. Johnson, Secretary, Maryland Department of Human Resources
(Sept. 30, 2002) (on file with author). Advocates reported multiple instances of discrimi-
natory policies and practices, but the final letter from HHS required little change. Id.
According to HHS policy, whether to undertake a compliance review and what its scope
should be are decisions solely within the discretion of the Agency. Id. While the Agency
investigates all complaints, the process can take many months and relief does not necessa-
rily include systemic change. Id.; see also Cary LeCheen, Using Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act on Behalf of Clients on TANFPrograms, 8 GEo.J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1, 100-
10 (2001).
209. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTs. art. 24.
210. See infta Part II.A.
211. See infra Part 1I.B.
212. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
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Maryland has been applying a "rational basis with bite" test to certain
economic and social regulations.213 Under this line of cases, the test
is stated in a conventional way: the State must articulate a legitimate
governmental objective for its classification, and demonstrate that the
classification is rationally related to that objective. 214 Where the court
has deviated from tradition is in its examination of the fit between the
objective and the classification, which it has done in a more sustained
and demanding way than would be expected under the traditional
test.
21 5
The earliest case in the line is Kirsch v. Prince George's County,2 16 a
1993 decision in which the court held unconstitutional a zoning ordi-
nance that restricted the rental of residential properties to three or
more students pursuing higher education.217 Although the regula-
tion is clearly an economic one, the court examined the differentia-
tion closely and concluded that it was "arbitrary."21  Under the
ordinance, the property could be rented to people identical to the
student groups in every way except in their occupation. 219 The court
found the distinction between students and non-students to be
"wholly unrelated" to the articulated purpose of the ordinance.22 °
In dissent, Judge Chasanow defended the rationality of the ordi-
nance on the basis that students have different needs and perform
differently as residents of rental properties than non-students.2 1 In
his view, the majority "seem[ed] to be either subtly altering the ra-
tional basis test, or pay[ing] lip service to that test but refus[ed] to
apply it." 2 2 2
It turned out that Judge Chasanow was right, as the Court con-
firmed in Verzi v. Baltimore County2 23 the next year.224  Baltimore
County adopted an ordinance requiring tow operators to have a place
213. See infra notes 216-248 and accompanying text.
214. E.g., Kirsch v. Prince George's County, 331 Md. 89, 104, 626 A.2d 372, 379 (1993).
215. See, e.g., id. at 108-09, 626 A.2d at 381-82 (Chasanow, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the majority pays lip service to the rational basis test but ignores the strong presumption of
constitutionality accorded under rational basis to the fit between the government interest
and the classification).
216. 331 Md. 89, 626 A.2d 372 (1993).
217. Id. at 106, 626 A.2d at 380.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 107-08, 626 A.2d at 381.
221. Id. at 110-11, 626 A.2d at 382-83 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 108, 626 A.2d at 381.
223. 333 Md. 411, 635 A.2d 967 (1994).
224. Id. at 419, 635 A.2d at 971 (commenting that a legislative classification must have a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation regardless of any strong pre-
sumption of constitutionality).
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of business within the county before the police could call them to tow
away vehicles disabled by accidents.225 Plaintiffs place of business was
located less than three miles from the county line, and he was denied
the opportunity to be called to accident sites.2 26 The court over-
turned the ordinance on the basis that it constituted an unlawful clas-
sification that denied equal protection to the nonresident
businesses.
227
In a revealing paragraph, the court explained its rational basis
test by quoting from State Board of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn.228 The
Verzi court stated: "Although we have traditionally accorded legislative
determinations a strong presumption of constitutionality, .. . we have
also required that a legislative classification rest upon 'some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation.' "229
The County's stated purposes for the towing restriction were to
protect the public from fraud and to decrease traffic congestion and
delays. 230 According to the court, the justifications would be legiti-
mate except that the relationship between the purposes and the classi-
fication was so weak that it was instead a pretext for giving an
economic benefit to local residents, to the economic detriment of
nonresidents. 2 1 The ordinance was different from territorial classifi-
cations that were previously upheld because, according to the court,
in those cases the "primary legislative purpose of the classification was
other than economic, and . the classification bore a real and sub-
stantial relation to the object of the legislation. 23 2
Kirsch and Verzi both involve economic regulation by a local gov-
ernment. 2  Neither involves a social welfare program run by the state
government. Although, traditionally, economic and social regulation
are both subject to the same level of scrutiny, Kirsch and Verzi left open
the possibilities that the court would not apply the rational basis with
bite standard to a social program and that the court would subject
225. Id. at 413, 635 A.2d at 967-68.
226. Id. at 414-15, 635 A.2d at 968-69.
227. Id. at 427-28, 635 A.2d at 975.
228. 270 Md. 496, 312 A.2d 216 (1973). Kuhn involved a sex discrimination case de-
cided shortly after Maryland's Equal Rights Amendment was adopted, and the Supreme
Court had begun to subject classifications based on sex to heightened scrutiny. Id.
229. Verzi, 333 Md. at 419, 635 A.2d at 971 (citations omitted).
230. Id. at 425, 635 A.2d at 974.
231. Id. at 427, 635 A.2d at 975.
232. Id. at 422, 635 A.2d at 972.
233. Kirsch v. Prince George's County, 331 Md. 89, 107-08, 626 A.2d 372, 381 (1993);
Verzi, 333 Md. at 413, 635 A.2d at 967.
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discrimination by the state government differently from discrimina-
tion by local governments.23 4
Both possibilities were negated by the court's most recent deci-
sion in this line, Frankel v. Board of Regents.2 5 In Frankel, the Court of
Appeals, once again applying a rational basis with bite standard, invali-
dated a state university policy of denying in-state tuition status to stu-
dents who receive more than half of their support from non-residents,
regardless of other indicia of the student's domicile.2"6 In-state tui-
tion is a form of social welfare program in that it provides a special
opportunity for students to obtain higher education.23 7 Further, it is a
program funded by the State, so discrimination in the opportunity to
benefit from in-state tuition is a state policy, not a policy of a local
jurisdiction.23
As in the earlier cases, the Frankel court took no issue with the
State's objective of providing the benefit of lower tuition costs to
Maryland residents and denying that benefit to those from out-of-
state.2" 9 The problem arose with the means used to achieve that ob-
jective. 24" The university's policy classified residents as in-state or out-
of-state based on the source of their monetary support.24' To qualify
for in-state status, the student had to receive more than half of his or
her economic support from a resident of the State.2 42 The court
noted that the policy could deny in-state status to bona fide Maryland
residents, such as a student born in-state whose parent moves out-of-
state and a resident student whose tuition is paid by a generous out-of-
state grandparent. 243 The policy, the court concluded, imposed eco-
nomic burdens on some Maryland residents to the benefit of others
without a rational basis for doing SO. 2 44
"Rational basis with bite," as described and applied by the Court
of Appeals of Maryland, subjects classifications to a more stringent re-
234. See Kirsch, 331 Md. at 106, 626 A.2d at 380 (explaining that the crucial question was
whether a county ordinance classification advanced its economic objectives, such as park-
ing congestion); see also Vezi, 333 Md. at 425, 626 A.2d at 974 (examining whether a Balti-
more County ordinance affecting out of county businesses related to government
interests).
235. 361 Md. 298, 761 A.2d 324 (2000).
236. Id. at 312, 761 A.2d at 331.
237. Id. at 302, 761 A.2d at 326.
238. Id. at 301, 761 A.2d at 325.
239. Id at 317, 761 A.2d at 334.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 302-03, 761 A.2d at 326-27.
242. Id. at 317, 761 A.2d at 334.
243. Id. at 317-18, 761 A.2d at 334.
244. Id. at 314-15, 761 A.2d at 333.
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view than the traditional rational basis test.24 5 Even though the State
must have a legitimate objective which, in theory, could be scruti-
nized, the court has focused so far on the fit between the State's objec-
tive and the classification. In the three cases where the fit has been
found wanting, the court appears to be requiring the State to produce
actual evidence that the classification serves the purpose, rather than
the hypothetical justifications usually accepted under the rational ba-
sis test. For example, in Verzi, the court rejected the County's unsup-
ported assertion that out-of-county towing companies would be harder
to regulate in light of evidence that the County had a process for su-
pervising towing companies operating in the County.2"6 In Frankel,
the court refused to accept the Board of Regents' claim that non-
residents were the target of the policy, when at least two categories of
bona fide residents were harmed by it.247
The three cases also demonstrate a particular sensitivity for situa-
tions in which benefits and burdens are distributed differently among
residents of the State. In Verzi, in fact, the court analogized the State's
equal protection doctrine to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
the United States Constitution:
Just as the Privileges and Immunities Clause frowns on arbi-
trary distinctions among citizens of different states, particu-
larly in the area of economic regulation, the concept of
equal protection of the laws found in Article 24 frowns on
arbitrary distinctions among citizens of different counties
within Maryland.248
B. Heightened Scrutiny
Double devolution is constitutionally suspect because classifying
people solely on the basis of their residence or locality for the purpose
of deciding whether and how they should be treated in the welfare
program cannot withstand rational basis scrutiny, at least in the man-
ner the test has been applied in recent years by the Court of Appeals
of Maryland. 24" Discrimination on the basis of residence, however, is
not a fully satisfactory approach. Welfare is a social welfare program
that affects the most vulnerable residents of any state: children,
245. See Verzi v. Baltimore County, 333 Md. 411, 419, 635 A.2d 967, 971 (1994) (stating
that the court has required that legislative classifications have a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation).
246. Id. at 426, 635 A.2d at 974.
247. Frankel, 361 Md. at 317-18, 761 A.2d at 334.
248. Veni, 333 Md. at 424, 635 A.2d at 973.
249. See supra Part II.A.
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women of color, and adults and children with disabilities.25 ° If a gov-
ernment program treats people needing welfare unfairly, the special
vulnerability of the government's victims should, if possible, be made
visible in the legal theories argued on their behalf.25' Residence dis-
crimination is not a theory that makes their special vulnerability
visible.252
An alternative level of review applied by the Court of Appeals is
heightened scrutiny. Heightened scrutiny is a valuable form of review,
because it calls on the court to determine whether the government's
objectives are important, not only whether, as in rational basis review,
the government has chosen the proper means to achieve the objec-
tive.253 In the case of welfare reform, the question would be the valid-
ity of the objective of double devolution. As stated by the Department
of Human Resources, the objective is to give local administrators au-
tonomy to design requirements and procedures adapted to their local
circumstances.254
The importance of considering heightened scrutiny as the appro-
priate level of review in the context of double devolution is high-
lighted by two of the examples provided earlier: the differences in the
award of welfare avoidance grants and the differences in the identifi-
cation of families experiencing domestic violence.255 In both situa-
tions, the correlation is impressive between the availability of the
benefit and the racial makeup of the county in which one applies.
Residents of counties with the largest percentage of African Ameri-
cans were the least likely, on the whole, to receive the benefits of
WAGs and family violence identification. If double devolution has
permitted racialized outcomes to occur and to go unnoticed and un-
corrected by state officials, the only likely source of assistance is in thejudiciary.256 If courts apply a deferential standard such as rational ba-
250. See infra notes 274-279 and accompanying text.
251. See U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 541 (1973) (discussing the vulner-
ability of impoverished individuals).
252. See, e.g., Franke4 361 Md. at 314-15, 761 A.2d at 333 (assuming that a residency
classification that imposes economic burdens is not based on a suspect class).
253. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971) (requiring states to base classifications that
provide different treatment "upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the objective of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall
be treated alike").
254. THE FAMILY INVESTMENT ADMINISTRATION 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 82, at 17.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 143-156.
256. See Diller, supra note 20, at 1212 (noting that devolution may mean critical deci-
sions are made at government levels that do not have a strong tradition of factoring public
input into their rulemaking).
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sis review, even rational basis review with bite, the judiciary may not
perform its protective role with sufficient force.
257
The door to heightened scrutiny review under Article 24 of the
Maryland Constitution opened in the case of Attorney General of Mary-
land v. Waldron,258 where the Court of Appeals found a denial of equal
protection in a statute that required retired judges to forfeit their pen-
sions if they engaged in the practice of law for pay.25 9 After a lengthy
exploration of the development of heightened scrutiny review by the
United States Supreme Court under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, the Waldron court concluded that the right to pursue one's
chosen occupation was not fundamental, but it was important enough
to require more than the most deferential form of rational basis re-
view.2 6 ° The court tailored its review to take into account the "vital
personal interests . . .substantially affected by a statutory classifica-
tion."2 6 ' The subsequent interpretations of the court's decision see it
as applying a "heightened scrutiny" standard.2 6 2 Under such a stan-
dard, "courts should not reach out and speculate as to the existence of
possible justifications for the challenged enactment." '2 6 3 "Rather, [the
court] must evaluate either those statutory purposes which are readily
discernible or a legitimate purpose that, presumably, motivated an im-
partial legislature." '26 4
In Waldron, the court rejected two of the Attorney General's three
proffered objectives.2 65 The first was rejected on the basis that it was
inconsistent with the statute's language and structure.
266 The second
was rejected as an illegitimate "post hoc rationalization" which would
have required the court to engage in "tautological equal protection
analysis by deducing purpose from result. ' 26 7 The third proffered ob-
jective was accepted as legitimate, but the fit between the objective
and the classification scheme was found inadequate in light of the
257. See, e.g., Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 657, 458 A.2d
758, 790 (1983) (applying a rational basis standard in upholding a Maryland school financ-
ing system that resulted in disparity among school districts).
258. 289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d 929 (1981).
259. Id. at 726-27, 426 A.2d at 953.
260. Id. at 717-19, 426 A.2d at 948-49.
261. Id. at 717, 426 A.2d at 948.
262. See, e.g., Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 357, 601 A.2d 102, 109 (1992); Har-
grove v. Bd. of Trustees, 310 Md. 406, 418, 529 A.2d 1372, 1378 (1987); Hornbeck v. Som-
erset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 653, 458 A.2d 758, 788 (1983).
263. Waldron, 289 Md. at 717, 426 A.2d at 948.
264. Id. at 722, 426 A.2d at 950.
265. See id. at 722-24, 426 A.2d at 950-51 (discussing the three purposes the Attorney
General gave and explaining why two were not legitimate).
266. Id. at 722-23, 426 A.2d at 950-51.
267. Id. at 724, 426 A.2d at 951.
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importance of the interest of retired judges in being allowed to pur-
sue their occupational choice.2 68
In several subsequent cases, the Court of Appeals has declined to
apply heightened scrutiny review. In each case, the party seeking
heightened scrutiny review argued that the standard should be ap-
plied because the party had been deprived of an important right.2 70
In each, the court found the right did not exist or that no significant
interference with the right had occurred.271 In no case did the dis-
crimination affect groups of people with particular vulnerabilities. 272
The best argument for applying heightened scrutiny to double
devolution in welfare reform is that applicants for, and recipients of,
cash assistance under TANF have a vital personal interest in a welfare
system that delivers benefits and services to people depending on
their individual circumstances and not based on their county of resi-
dence.273 The essence of the argument is that applicants and recipi-
ents have a right- to be treated as a "citizen of the State" rather than a
citizen of a county, at least in regard to a program that is funded and
administered by or through a state agency rather than through a local
agency. As citizens of the State, applicants and recipients should be at
no greater risk of being treated disparately for reasons that might be
related to one's sex, race, age, or physical or mental condition, or for
reasons that conflate several of those characteristics.
Sex, race, disability, and age are not explicit classifying factors in
welfare. As a matter of practical reality, however, nearly everyone who
suffers the life experiences that lead to eligibility for benefits belongs
268. Id.
269. See Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 653, 458 A.2d 758, 788(1983) (deciding that the State's mixed state and local school financing scheme, which
resulted in different expenditures on public education in different counties, had "no sig-
nificant interference with, infringement upon, or deprivation of the underlying right to
take advantage of a thorough and efficient education . . ." and, therefore, there was no
reason to apply heightened scrutiny review); Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 362-67,
601 A.2d 102, 112-14 (1992) (concluding that a plaintiff subject to a legislative cap on non-
economic damages in tort cases was not deprived of "important personal rights," because
the right to ajury trial was not violated and no right to a common law measure of damages
existed, and therefore heightened scrutiny review was not triggered); Maryland Aggregates
Ass'n v. State, 337 Md. 658, 673 n.10, 655 A.2d 886, 893 n.10 (1995) (stating that there is
no right to heightened scrutiny for legislation affecting a common law right).
270. See, e.g., Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 653, 458 A.2d at 788; Muphy, 325 Md. at 362, 601 A.2d
at 111-12; Maryland Aggregates, 337 Md. at 673 n.10, 655 A.2d at 893 n.10.
271. See discussion supra note 269.
272. See, e.g., Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 603, 458 A.2d at 761 (affecting school districts); Mur-
phy, 325 Md. at 362, 601 A.2d at 111-12 (affecting tort plaintiffs); Maryland Aggregates, 337
Md. at 663, 655 A.2d at 888-89 (affecting surface mine operators).
273. See Cimini, supra note 12, at 91-92.
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to the less-favored half of at least one of the four classifications.274 Far
more women than men experience severe poverty when becoming
parents.2 75 A far larger percentage of people of color than European-
Americans experience poverty and unemployment.2 76 A far greater
proportion of people with disabilities experience extreme poverty and
unemployment, as compared to people without disabilities.2 7 7 Simi-
larly, people who care for children with disabilities are more likely to
suffer poverty than people whose children do not have disabling con-
ditions. 7 ' Finally, far more children experience desperate economic
need as compared with adults. 279 Welfare reform policies, therefore,
need not explicitly identify the classification scheme that, in practice,
occurs: African-American women with children, particularly those
with disabilities or whose children have disabilities, are in one group,
while everyone else is in the other.28" The absence of explicit discrim-
inatory classification may insulate welfare policies from the most
searching level of equal protection review.28 1 It should not blind deci-
sion-makers, however, from the practical import of welfare policies. A
level of judicial review that takes into account the possibilities that
state welfare policies permit mistreatment of disfavored groups is
essential.
Maryland constitutional jurisprudence lends weight to the argu-
ment that heightened scrutiny is appropriate when a state program
may put at risk the interests of members of certain groups of re-
274. See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ADMINISTRATION
FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, CHARACTERISTICS AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF TANF RECIPI-
ENrs OCTOBER 1999-SEPTEMBER 2000, available at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/
opre/characteristics/fy2000/analysis.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2004) [hereinafter DHHS
CHARACTERISTICS AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF TANF RECIPIENTS].
275. Id. Men represent only 10% of all adult recipients. Id. In 2000, African Americans
and Hispanic Americans comprised 6.7% of all welfare recipients. Id
276. Id.
277. LaCheen, supra note 206, at 110 (noting that more than half of families applying
for or receiving TANF benefits have at least one member with a disability recognized under
the ADA).
278. Jennifer Pokempner & Dorothy E. Roberts, Poverty, Welfare Reform, and the Meaning
of Disability, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 425, 428, 431-33 (2001).
279. DHHS, CHARACTERISTICS AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF TANF RECIPIENTS, supra
note 274, at table 1. The average number of persons in TANF families was 2.6, while two-
thirds of TANF families had only one adult recipient. Id.
280. See supra notes 274-279 and accompanying text (describing the percentages of wel-
fare recipients).
281. See Attorney Gen. of Md. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 705-06, 426 A.2d 929, 941-42
(1981) (noting that strict scrutiny only applies where a statute discriminates based upon
suspect criteria, or where it infringes upon a fundamental right).
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sidents.282 Maryland has a long history of race discrimination, begin-
ning in its earliest history as a state that permitted the ownership of
slaves until the end of the Civil War. Maryland's courts came late to
the struggle to overcome race discrimination, but a body of doctrine
now exists asserting the right of people of color to be treated as
equals.283 Maryland's sex discrimination law includes the Article 46,
the State Equal Rights Amendment,28 4 which has been interpreted as
requiring strict scrutiny in situations where a benefit or a burden is
allocated on the basis of gender.28 5 The degree of scrutiny exceeds
that required under federal law, which requires only heightened scru-
tiny in cases of gender discrimination.286 Exercising its special man-
date under Article 46, Maryland courts have recognized the need to
protect men and women from discrimination on the basis of gender.
For example, the Court of Appeals banned the use of preemptory
strikes against jurors on the basis of gender before the practice was
barred by the Supreme Court.2 8 7
Significant interference with the vital personal right of welfare
applicants and recipients to be treated as citizens of the State is
demonstrated by the data discussed above, which, at a minimum,
strongly suggest that assessment practices are worse in some parts of
the State than in others, and that the worst places are often the places
with majority African-American populations.2 8 The data also demon-
strates that financial eligibility is probably weighed differently in some
parts of the State than in others, with the result that eligibility deter-
minations affecting financially eligible families vary from place to
place on the basis of locally established criteria and in the absence of
substantial state supervision.289
The vital personal interests of applicants and recipients to be
treated fairly and with a reasonable degree of uniformity as citizens of
the State should justify application of the heightened scrutiny stan-
dard of review. The question then becomes, what important objective
282. See, e.g., id. at 726-27, 426 A.2d at 953 (applying heightened scrutiny to a statute
that denied retired judges their pension plans if they engaged in the practice of law for
pay).
283. See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 229-30 (1964).
284. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 46.
285. See, e.g., State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 315 Md. 254, 295, 554 A.2d 366, 386-87
(1989).
286. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 570-72 (1996); Miss. Univ. for Wo-
men v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982).
287. Compare Tyler v. State, 330 Md. 261, 623 A.2d 648 (1993), withJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex
rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
288. See supra Part I.B.1-4.
289. See supra notes 193-197 and accompanying text.
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will the State argue underlies the decision to permit differential treat-
ment of applicants for, and recipients of, cash assistance depending
on their county of residence?
C. Rational Basis with Bite, Heightened Scrutiny and Double Devolution
The policy of the State to permit subdivisions of the Department
of Human Resources to design, as well as administer, welfare reform
at the county level means, as shown earlier in this Article, that what
benefits any particular resident of the State receives and how that per-
son is treated varies widely depending on where the resident lives.
Differences begin with recipiency rates: residents of some counties
have a chance of being awarded cash assistance that is less than half
the chance experienced by a resident of other counties .290 Differ-
ences continue in regard to assessment and program services. 291 In
some jurisdictions, residents have no chance, at least at a statistical
level, of being awarded a welfare avoidance grant or being identified
as experiencing family violence or needing services to overcome fam-
ily violence. 21 2 In other jurisdictions, WAGs, family violence identifi-
cation and services, and useful work activity assignments are more
common.
293
In Maryland's plan, delivered to the United States Department of
Human Resources to support the payment of federal TANF funds, the
State maintained that local departments needed the opportunity to
tailor the requirements and procedures of their programs because lo-
cal officials would "kno [w] best the kinds of resources available to,
and services needed by, their customers." 294 Local flexibility, how-
ever, was not intended to deny customers access to core components
of the program. The government's objective of delivering services tai-
lored to what TANF applicants and recipients need in light of local
resources and customer needs is presumed valid.295 The question
under heightened scrutiny becomes whether the means chosen to
meet that objective bear a fair and substantial relation to the objec-
tive.29 6 The means chosen, in this instance, is to classify applicants
and recipients according to the county of their residence. A resident
290. See supra Part I.B.2 and accompanying text.
291. See supra Part I.B.1, 3-4.
292. See supra Part I.B.1-3.
293. Id.
294. STATE PLAN OF 1996, supra note 42, at 1.
295. See, e.g., Frankel v. Bd. of Regents, 361 Md. 298, 317, 761 A.2d 324, 334 (2000);
Verzi v. Baltimore County, 333 Md. 411, 425, 635 A.2d 967, 975 (1994); Kirsch v. Prince
George's County, 331 Md. 89, 105-06, 626 A.2d 372, 381 (1993).
296. See supra notes 258-274 and accompanying text.
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of a county is entitled to be treated according to the requirements and
procedures adopted by the local department operating in that county.
For these differentiations based on residence to be valid under height-
ened scrutiny, double devolution must bear a fair and substantial rela-
tionship to the objective of providing locally responsive programs and
services to TANF applicants and recipients.
It is a hard case for the State to make. For example, a family in
poverty in Baltimore City, prior to October 2000, was much more
likely to be awarded cash assistance than a family in poverty anywhere
else in the State. 29 7 Baltimore City experienced a high unemploy-
ment rate, which helps to explain why its local residents were probably
well served by requirements and procedures that permitted people to
receive cash assistance. 29" Families in some jurisdictions outside of
Baltimore City, however, faced similar unemployment rates, and they
were not welcomed as frequently into the cash assistance program
even though employment was probably no more likely for them as an
alternative means of support.299 If access to employment, at least as
measured by unemployment rates, did not vary among residents of
different jurisdictions, then allowing Maryland residents to be treated
differently solely on the basis of their residence can hardly be said to
bear a fair and substantial relationship to the State's objective.
Similarly, after October 2000, the recipiency rates of Baltimore
families declined while rates rose in many other jurisdictions.3 0 0 Eco-
nomic conditions, including access to paid employment, cannot ex-
plain the differences, because Baltimore did not experience better
employment conditions than other jurisdictions. 30 1 Indeed, Balti-
more probably experienced worse conditions. Residents of Baltimore
City received less favorable treatment than in the past, while residents
of other jurisdictions received more favorable treatment.30 2 The dif-
ferences turned on where they lived, not on whether employment was
available to them as an alternative to cash assistance. 3
The Court of Appeals has upheld differential treatment by the
State of residents on the basis that they live in different local jurisdic-
tions.3° ' The key case is Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board of Educa-
297. See supra notes 175-178 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 102-106 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 102-106, 119-124 and accompanying text.
303. Id
304. See infra notes 305-307 and accompanying text.
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tion.3 0 5 The issue in Hornbeck was whether the combined state and
local school financing scheme was constitutional because it failed to
equalize funding and, therefore, left students in poorer jurisdictions
with fewer educational resources. °6 The court upheld the financing
scheme as rational and thus constitutional. 30 7 But the court's decision
predated its adoption of the rational basis with bite standard of re-
view.30 ' For that and other reasons discussed later, the court's deci-
sion provides little reason to predict that double devolution in the
context of TANF would be found a constitutional form of locality
discrimination.
One reason given by the Court of Appeals for upholding local
funding of public schools, with the concomitant disparities in funding
across the State, is that local funding is related to the quality of local
control over education. 30 9 According to the court, more interest and
concern will be shown by local jurisdictions over programs into which
they have to invest money, and that is beneficial for schools.
3 1 0 TANF
is funded on a statewide basis, however, either through the block
grant from the federal government or the State matching funds re-
quired by law.3" Because there is no political interest accountability
that might accompany local funding decisions, that justification found
in Hornbeck would not be satisfied.
To understand the importance of local accountability, it is useful
to imagine what, if anything, might a locally controlled program do
differently from a program controlled by officials responsive only to
state priorities? Baltimore City is the jurisdiction that must be studied
for this purpose because it is both the jurisdiction with the most TANF
recipients and one of the jurisdictions that experiences high rates of
poverty and low-to-negative rates of economic growth.
3 12 If the City
were in control of the TANF program, rather than the State, how
would it be different? Presumably, in a time of negative job growth,
the City has an interest in satisfying potential and current employers
that the City has a workforce available to meet the needs of those em-
ployers. TANF planning and funding could be used to further this
goal in a variety of ways. For example, people with families could rely
305. 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983).
306. Id. at 603, 458 A.2d at 761-62.
307. Id. at 657, 458 A.2d at 790.
308. Compare Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 641-42, 654-56, 458 A.2d at 781-82, 789-90 (decided in
1983), with Verzi v. Baltimore County, 333 Md. 411, 419, 635 A.2d 967, 971 (1994).
309. Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 654-57, 458 A.2d at 789-90.
310. Id.
311. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
312. See supra Part I.B.1.
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on TANF cash assistance to help free up the time needed to complete
certification or training programs useful to employers. The City has
an interest in efficiently delivering relevant training and certification
opportunities to residents, so it is important that programs leading to
employment get funded and appropriate people are selected to par-
ticipate. It would be likely, therefore, that the City would want TANF
administrators to work closely with the local workforce development
process to ensure that work development expertise guide TANF fund-
ing decisions and that TANF recipients are selected for programs that
best suited their talents, interests, and prospects. In times of high un-
employment in the City, further, the City would want to use TANF
funding to open doors to residents finding jobs outside of the City, as
their income would benefit the City through income and other taxes.
Because the job market in Baltimore, as in most cities, is regional, the
City would want TANF administrators to work with other programs in
the region to identify ways to open doors to employment by Baltimore
City residents throughout the region.
The City's interests in TANF extend beyond employment oppor-
tunities and conditions. For example, in recent years, the City has
taken an interest in improving services for families experiencing do-
mestic violence. 13 Changes have been made in police, judicial, and
medical systems to make it more likely that people will be identified
and that proper services will be delivered.3"4 The TANF program
could add an additional component to this process, by ensuring that
impoverished families suffering from violence can access public bene-
fits while taking advantage of other protective and supportive pro-
grams.315 Similarly, the City has an interest in making sure that
children and parents who experience disabilities get support from the
public benefits system.
A close examination of the Department of Social Services 2002
TANF plan and other policy documents are illuminating for the ways
in which the plan does not seem to have much connection to what the
City might want if the City were in charge of TANF. t6
313. See FAMILY INVESTMENT PROGRAM LEGAL CLINIC, STATUS REPORT, supra note 41, at 12-14 (noting some of the family violence option procedures adopted by the Baltimore City
Department of Social Services).
314. See id. at 9-10, 14, 24 (noting the correction of illegal Medicaid terminations, proce-dures used to identify individuals who qualify under the family violence option, and the
use of expungement procedures to clear arrests).
315. See HETLING-WERNJ & BORN, supra note 145, at 4 (stating that welfare and cash
assistance programs are critical for individuals who suffer from domestic violence and pov-
erty in achieving self-sufficiency).
316. See generally TANF STATE PLAN, supra note 130.
[VOL. 63:655
WELFARE REFORM, EQUAL PROTECTION
Recall first that residents of Baltimore City have had a statistically
zero chance of getting a Welfare Avoidance Grant, or WAG.
31 7 In Jan-
uary 2002, the Baltimore City Local Department of Social Services
(BCDSS) issued a new policy statement about WAGs, replacing policy
statements issued in 1997 and 1998.318 Under the new policy, a WAG
is available where it would provide "any needs that would allow for
immediate employment." ' WAGs can be awarded to pay for tools
and equipment, to purchase, repair or insure a car, to help a person
become self-employed, to pay for emergency child care, to cover mov-
ing expenses, and, on rare occasions, to cover basic living expenses.
3 20
The major change in 2002 is the opportunity for a WAG to be
used to buy, repair, or insure a car. 32 1 Prior to the issuance of the new
guidance, the BCDSS Plan contained only two types of transportation
assistance.322 Recipients could get bus passes or they could participate
in a van program providing transportation to jobs located in a subur-
ban location.3 23 No assistance was available for private transportation,
such as a car.3 2 4
If Baltimore City's plan reflected the local employment condi-
tions, then one would expect that, prior to 2002, people looking for
jobs did not need cars. Public transportation and the van program
were sufficient. That was not the case, however: over 35% of entry-
level jobs in the Baltimore region were not accessible by public
325transportation.
Next, recall that residents of Baltimore who are experiencing do-
mestic violence have little chance of being identified by the BCDSS
when they apply for or receive TANF benefits; 326 examining the Plan
helps to explain this void because it makes no mention at all of the
family violence option under TANF. 3 27 With the exception of some
money for staff training, the Plan is silent on how the Department will
317. See Part I.B.2 and Chart 9 supra.
318. SOP #02-01, supra note 31.
319. Id at 5.
320. Id. at 3-5.
321. Id. at 2-3.
322. BALTIMORE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, FAMILY INVESTMENT PLAN FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2002, at 59-61 (2001) [hereinafter BALTIMORE CITY PLAN].
323. Id.
324. See generally id.
325. JENNIFER FREEMAN & JERRY RUBIN, STRATEGIES TO ADVANCE LOW-WAGE WORKERS IN
MARYLAND: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 6-7 (2000), available at http://www.jff.org/jff/
PDFDocuments/MDLWPolicy.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
326. See Part I.B.3 and Chart 13 supra (noting the low likelihood of being identified
under the family violence option in Baltimore City).
327. See generally BALTIMORE CITY PLAN, supra note 322.
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spend money to identify and service families where domestic violence
is occurring, whether through or in coordination with other programs
undertaken through the City government or separately.
The Plan includes a number of work activity programs through
which recipients get help preparing for and obtaining employment. 328
The programs are administered under contracts with non-profit agen-
cies and with government agencies, including the Mayor's Office of
Employment Development and Baltimore City Head Start.3 29 Al-
though these contracts, as well as language in the Plan about working
with community agencies, suggest that the TANF program is devel-
oped in response to local needs, a closer reading of the descriptions
leads to a somewhat different conclusion. For example, the Plan in-
cludes no information about what kinds of jobs are available in or
near Baltimore, how much they pay, or what kinds of employees em-
ployers are looking for. It contains no detailed descriptions about the
characteristics of adult TANF recipients, how those characteristics
make them more or less attractive to employers in the region, or how
less attractive recipients could become more likely to obtain employ-
ment. It contains no information about what the City's planning or
workforce investment board processes have identified as priorities for
the City's economic well-being, or how TANF funding decisions serve
those priorities. While many of the service-providers may indeed help
people get employed, the Plan does not explain why that should be
the result. In short, the Plan makes it look as if the BCDSS randomly
concluded that certain non-profit and governmental agencies should
get money based on little more than hunches about what kinds ofjobs
might be available to, and appropriate for, people in Baltimore who
rely on TANF.
A fourth area where city officials might differ with the BCDSS is
in the treatment of people with disabilities. While federal law man-
dates that no more than twenty percent of a state's TANF-funded
caseload can receive cash assistance for longer than sixty months,"3 °
state law eliminates the twenty percent limit if a larger number of fam-
ilies are experiencing hardships.33' As a result, there is no necessity
for families struggling with disabilities (affecting the parent, the child,
or both) to leave the rolls for work. City employment planners might
prefer keeping these families on public benefits and out of the job
market for two reasons. First, fewer people seeking work reduces
328. See, e.g., id. at 4-5 (outlining the work activity programs).
329. See, e.g., id. at 21.
330. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a) (7) (A) (2000).
331. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 7, § .03.03.30(A)(10) (2004).
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competition for the few jobs available in the City. Second, job train-
ing resources could be focused on people whose barriers to employ-
ment may be easier to remove because they are not disabled or caring
for a person with a disability.
BCDSS's plan takes the opposite tack. The Plan emphasizes the
difficulties faced by BCDSS because it appears that many people in the
caseload experience extensive or difficult barriers to work, such as dis-
abilities. 3 ' The solution, however, is not to keep on the rolls any
among these "hard-to-serve" families that are unlikely to find employ-
ment, at least in the near future in the existing economy. Instead, the
solution is to do individualized assessments leading to employability
plans. Out of a budget of $14,591,929 for work activity programs avail-
able to TANF recipients, forty percent, nearly $6,000,000, was budg-
eted for projects serving people with multiple or difficult barriers to
work, including disabilities of various kinds affecting both adults and
children in the families.3"3 City planners could look at that
$6,000,000 and, no doubt, find multiple ways to spend it on people
whose average likelihood of employment is demonstrably greater.
Even after allocating so much money for people facing above-av-
erage difficulties, BCDSS has been a leader in the State in the last few
years in terminating benefits for families because of noncompliance
with the work activity requirement, both before and after they exceed
the sixty-month time limit. 34 Again, the City would probably prefer
to keep such families supplied with the minimal support that public
benefits provide rather than having them fall into even deeper pov-
erty. With public benefits, the families have income that is the
equivalent, approximately, of sixty-one percent of the poverty line.335
Without it, they often fall into extreme poverty. These families are
less likely to become employed than families leaving welfare under
other circumstances. In general, children in extreme poverty perform
worse in school and generally have more troubled childhoods than
other children in poverty.336 Given the condition of the schools in the
City, having even more children in extreme poverty would not be
welcome.
Another reason the court upheld the differentiated school fund-
ing scheme in Hornbeck is the long tradition in the State of local fund-
ing for schools, apparently dating back, at least by some accounts, to
332. BALTIMORE CITY PLAN, supra note 322, at 4.
333. Id. at 75-76.
334. LIFE AFrER WELFARE: Fi-r REPORT, supra note 157, at 18.
335. See MD. REGS. CODE tit. 7, § 03.03.17 (2003).
336. Czapanskiy, supra note 22, at 352.
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the nineteenth-century creation of public schools. 37 Public benefits
have a quite different history. While many localities created and
funded relief programs for local residents, since the New Deal, most
of the relief available to families with minor children has been funded
by federal and state sources.338 Local administration continued for
decades after the creation of Aid to Dependent Children in 1935, but
even that ended, except in one jurisdiction, by the mid-1960s.339 In
1967, when administration of state and federally funded public bene-
fits programs became a state function, local jurisdictions were re-
quired to create a local commission to provide state officials with
input about whether the programs properly served local needs.34 °
These committees have no authority to require a local department of
social services to change anything, however. 341 The committee in Bal-
timore City has never heard from advocates about FIA, and may know
little about the program. The only routine input that local jurisdic-
tions have into the operation of the public benefits program is the
power to nominate people to serve as the director of the local depart-
ment. 3 42 The power to appoint and to remove the director, however,
rests with the Secretary of the Department of Human Resources, a
state official. 43
Finally, an important consideration for the Hornbeck court was the
failure of the plaintiffs to demonstrate that children in any of thejuris-
dictions were receiving less than a minimally acceptable standard of
education.3 44 The same cannot be said of the State's TANF program
under double devolution. For example, it is a requirement that every
family in the State be assessed to determine whether a welfare avoid-
337. Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 621-29, 458 A.2d 758,
771-75 (1983).
338. Diller, supra note 20, at 1134-37.
339. Id. at 1135-37.
340. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 14A (2003).
341. Id. The local commissions have a duty to evaluate local departments and programs,
make recommendations in connection with annual funds, and take active steps to secure
funds, but have no authority to make special policy changes. Id.
342. Id. § 14(A)(14).
343. Id. § 13(b). Although Baltimore's mayor has a formal role in the appointment of
the director, the Secretary of DHR has asserted that he does not need the mayor's concur-
rence when making a temporary appointment. That assertion was the subject of a lawsuit,
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore and Martin O'Malley v. Robert Ehrlich and Christopher Mc-
Cabe, which was filed November 24, 2003, in Baltimore Circuit Court. Tim Craig & Lori
Montgomery, O'Malley Sues Ehrlich for Appointing City Official, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2003, at
B2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A12062-2003Nov24.html
(last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
344. Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 652, 458 A.2d 758, 787
(1983).
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ance grant could be a substitute for a monthly cash grant.345 In more
than one jurisdiction, however, the possibility that a family will be
awarded a WAG is essentially zero, even though it is impossible to be-
lieve that no family in that jurisdiction might have become employed
if given a grant to buy a uniform or repair a car.346 It is also a require-
ment throughout the State that every family have the opportunity to
be identified as experiencing family violence and receive services if
needed.347 Yet, as shown earlier, in many jurisdictions the possibility
that a family will be identified as experiencing family violence or of
receiving necessary services is statistically zero. 48 Unexplained varia-
tions in recipiency rates also indicate that, in some jurisdictions, the
program may not be delivering the minimums required under state
law.3
4 9
Conceivably, the State will be able to demonstrate that there is a
basis in local economic conditions that justifies the differential treat-
ment that residents have received in the TANF program based on the
jurisdiction in which they reside. Unfortunately for the State, the evi-
dence will not be easy to find. The difficulty can be traced to the fact
that local departments are under no obligation to justify the choices
made to adopt requirements and procedures.3 5 ' In fact, they are
under no obligation to educate themselves about local economic and
employment conditions. As a result, the State has nothing in the con-
temporaneous record to explain why local department officials in Bal-
timore City concluded that WAGs were unnecessary for residents of
Baltimore County or why local department officials in another County
came to the opposite conclusion.
Based on the differences in outcomes in the different jurislic-
tions and the absence of a requirement that local officials formulate
their programs based on knowledge of local economic and employ-
ment conditions, it is tempting to conclude that the State adopted
double devolution for reasons other than a commitment to deliver
locally tailored services to TANF applicants and recipients. The most
likely explanations lie in the internal politics of the Department of
Human Resources, coupled with the political environment surround-
ing local and state responses to the concentration of families in pov-
erty in Baltimore City.
345. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 49(a)(2) (2002).
346. See supra Part I.B.2 and supra Chart 9.
347. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 7, § 03.03.07(I) (4) (f) (2004).
348. See supra Part I.B.3.
349. Id.
350. See generally TANF STATE PtAN, supra note 130.
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Within the Department, State officials located in the county of-
fices were eager for more opportunities to exercise control over their
operations. Their enthusiasm for "flexibility" was fully evident at a
meeting called by the Family Investment Administration in 2000."5'
Participants included a small number of advocates and service provid-
ers, a group from the one county with a separate agency, and a large
number of officials of DHR from central offices and from local depart-
ments.3 5 2 Twenty participants listed "local flexibility" as a strength of
the welfare program.353 The next item on the list garnered only ten
votes.354 At the same time, "poor communication between locals and
central offices" was listed as one of the weaknesses of the program by
seventeen participants. 55 Only six participants identified as a weak-
ness "local flexibility without accountability"; only three so identified
"inconsistency of program delivery from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. '5 6
The political environment is also at the heart of the decision to
devolve authority to "local" departments of social services. State offi-
cials could easily predict in 1996 that the problems of shifting from
AFDC to TANF would be the most difficult in Baltimore City, where
the caseloads were the highest and economic and employment condi-
tions among the worst.357 Double devolution allowed the State to per-
mit department officials located in Baltimore City not to make the
change from an income maintenance culture to a welfare-to-work cul-
ture while, at the same time, permitting the other jurisdictions to try
to make the change. Isolating Baltimore City is not a politically un-
popular thing to do in Maryland, unfortunately. In this case, allowing
Baltimore City residents to continue to collect cash assistance as if
they were still in an income maintenance program was good for fami-
lies in the short run. In the long run, however, it appears to mean
that thousands of families lost or are losing TANF eligibility while the
economy is slowing and thousands of jobs are being lost. Many of
these families might have had a better chance to weather the eco-
nomic storm if they had entered employment in the late 1990s during
351. See MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, FAMILY INVESTMENT ADMINISTRA-
TION, WHOLE SYSTEM COLLABORATIVE STRATEGIC PLANNING (2000) (on file with author)
[hereinafter WHOLE SYSTEM COLLABORATIVE STRATEGIC PLANNING], for a summary of the
meeting.
352. See generally id.
353. Id. at 21.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. See Part I.B.1.
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the first five years of welfare reform. Instead, they were denied the
assessments and services that might have made employment possible.
Residents of the other counties, on the other hand, had more oppor-
tunities to make the transition and, if they were then laid off, at least
they would still have some remaining months of eligibility for cash
assistance.
If heightened scrutiny were held to apply to the State's TANF
Plan, the State's objective in allowing local subdivisions of the Depart-
ment of Human Resources to have autonomy in the design of pro-
gram requirements and procedures could be scrutinized. As explored
earlier, the objective could be beneficial, if, as stated, the purpose of
double devolution is to conform requirements and procedures to give
applicants and recipients access to employment and support that will
help them become self-sufficient. For that to be the actual objective
of double devolution, however, would require that, in some important
way, economic and employment conditions in the State conform to
the boundaries of the twenty-four local jurisdictions. There is little
evidence for that proposition. On the whole, economic conditions in
Maryland are regional rather than local; no single jurisdiction is a self-
sufficient economic engine. Economic planning is largely a statewide
function rather than a local one, because local jurisdictions have so
little impact on the economic and employment conditions affecting
them.
Even if economic and employment conditions do not conform to
the boundaries of the cachement areas of local departments of social
services, the objective of allowing local flexibility might help appli-
cants and recipients become self-sufficient, if local administrators
gained substantial awareness of particular employment opportunities
and barriers, and took steps to organize programs for applicants and
recipients in response to those particular conditions. None of that
local knowledge is required of local department officials, however,
nor is there any requirement that state-level officials review local plans
to determine whether they take into account the particular issues af-
fecting their geographic area.1
5 8
In conclusion, it appears possible that double devolution is sus-
ceptible to attack on the basis that the State's objectives for classifying
applicants and recipients according to their place of residence are not
legitimate, and that, even if the objectives were legitimate, the fit be-
tween the objectives and the classification is poor.
358. See generally TANF STATE PLAN, supra note 130.
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III. REMEDIES
If there is no legitimate objective behind double devolution, or if
there is a legitimate objective but an insufficient nexus between the
purpose and the means of achieving the purpose, double devolution
should be found unconstitutional. The question then becomes, what
is the remedy?
Several possibilities exist. First, the State could be required to
administer a program that delivers the same benefits, assessments and
services regardless of the applicant or recipient's location. Second,
the State could be required to supervise more closely certain elements
of a program whose requirements and standards continue to be de-
signed by administrators in "local" offices. Third, the State could be
required to establish standards for programs and to require local ad-
ministrators to provide feedback about whether they have achieved
the standards. Fourth, the State could be required to work with the
governments of local jurisdictions to determine if they would accept
responsibility for all or part of the funding and administration of the
TANF program for their residents. The choices are complex, and I
can only sketch some principles here.
First, the State must be required to distinguish between aspects of
the program where local information and connections are important
and aspects of the program where uniform statewide standards are
key. For example, every applicant and recipient may be experiencing
violence in his or her family, so each needs an adequate assessment
and opportunity to get help. Most of the appropriate service pro-
grams, however, are run by local government or non-profit agencies.
The State should develop statewide procedures for assessing whether
an applicant or recipient needs help because of family violence, and
administrators in "local" offices should be required to adhere to the
statewide standards. At the same time, administrators in "local" offices
are probably in a better position than officials at the state level to
identify appropriate service providers in the neighborhood. The
State's role in that part of the program should be to set standards
about both the types of service providers needed and the nature of the
relationship that the "local" office should develop with those service
providers.
Second, the State must ensure that adequate funding is available
to serve the needs of recipients regardless of their location. Funding
decisions cannot be made by jurisdiction, in other words; they must be
made based on the needs of applicants and recipients so that they can
be treated as citizens of the State rather than as residents of a particu-
lar jurisdiction. It is no coincidence, for example, that Baltimore City
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has the largest percentage of long-term recipients of any jurisdiction
in the State, as it also has one of the lowest female employment rates
and large areas of concentrated poverty.359 Allocating funds to Balti-
more's local department of social services on the basis of the percent-
age of recipients who live in Baltimore City will not permit the
individuals living in the City to have access to sufficient resources.
Third, it must be acknowledged that race may matter in the deliv-
ery of TANF benefits, services and sanctions. If it continues to be the
case that certain aspects of the TANF program seem to work differ-
ently in places where more European-Americans live than in places
where more African Americans live, 6 ' the State must be held to its
affirmative duty to identify the issues and find solutions.
Fourth, the State welfare bureaucracy must develop competence
in understanding the economic and employment conditions in which
TANF applicants and recipients live and to make that understanding a
dynamic part of TANF services and requirements. The State must ac-
knowledge that many employment issues are regional or statewide,
rather than defined by local political boundaries, and it must find a
way to deliver employment-related services to TANF applicants and
recipients that respond to local, regional, and statewide employment
and economic conditions. Where possible, the State must enhance
the knowledge of administrators working at the local level about local,
regional, and statewide economic and employment conditions, so that
they can be more aware of the opportunities for economic self-suffi-
ciency that might be open for applicants and recipients in their area.
CONCLUSION
Double devolution held the promise that families in deep poverty
would be helped to achieve self-sufficiency through access to pro-
grams tailored to local economic and employment conditions.36 1
What appears to have happened instead in Maryland is that the State
officials exercising control over the program within the boundaries of
twenty-three of the State's twenty-four jurisdictions have created dif-
ferent programs, but the differences do not respond to the differ-
ences in employment opportunities in different parts of the State.3 6 2
The result is that, rather than being treated as citizens of the State,
applicants for and recipients of cash assistance under TANF are
359. See supra Part I.B. 1.
360. See supra Part I.B.2.
361. H.R. REp. No. 104-651, introduction, at 5-6 (1996).
362. See generally supra Part I.B.
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treated as citizens only of the jurisdiction in which they live. Their
access to, and services under, the state's program vary according to
the location of their residence. Unless the variability is justified, it
cannot be sustained.
Arguments can be made for the application of two standards of
review under the State constitution: rational basis with bite and
heightened scrutiny. Under both, it is likely that double devolution
will be found wanting, either for the absence of an important State
interest in allowing State officials to treat people differently solely on
the basis of the location of their residence, or on the basis that the
means chosen to accomplish the objective of appropriately tailored
treatment for applicants and recipients does not in fact serve that
objective.
It is essential for the State to take seriously the consequences of
double devolution for families in deep poverty. These families, like all
families, are entitled to be treated as citizens of the State. Their access
to state-funded resources and to federally funded resources that are
funneled through the State should not depend on which local juris-
diction in which they happen to live.
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